

Macroeconomic Preconditions For Investing Abroad

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Suggested Readings

Andrew Berg & Catherine Pattillo, “The Challenges of Predicting Economic Crises” *IMF Economic Issues* no. 22, July 2000.
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues22/index.htm>

Michael W. Klein, “Capital Account Openness and the Varieties of Growth Experience” NBER Working Paper no. 9500, February 2003.
<http://fletcher.tufts.edu/faculty/klein/pdfs/CapAcctGrowth.pdf>

Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, “The Primacy of Institutions (and what this does and does not mean),” *Finance and Development*, June 2003, pp. 31-34.
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/06/pdf/rodrik.pdf>

Macroeconomic Preconditions for Investing Abroad:

Questions to confront

1. Why?
2. What?
3. How?

Macroeconomic Preconditions for Investing Abroad:

Questions to confront

1. Why are there preconditions for investment (and not trade)?
2. What are these preconditions?
3. How do these matter?

but first

0. A Deeper Why

Why Should Countries Have an
Open Capital Account?

Why an Open Capital Account?

Why Not?

- Does an open capital account promote **economic growth and development**?
- Importance for investing abroad – long-run attractiveness of opportunities
- Does an open capital account add to the **likelihood of a financial crises**?
- Importance for investing abroad – asset price or exchange rate collapse.

Some Influential Opinions on Should Countries Have an Open Capital Account?

Lawrence Summers (2000) “...to the extent that international financial integration represents an **improvement in financial intermediation**,... it offers a potentially significant **increase in economic efficiency**.”

IMF (2000) “...[the Executive Board] has emphasized the substantial **benefits** of capital account liberalization, but stressed the need to carefully **manage and sequence** liberalization in order to minimize risks

Kenneth Rogoff (2001) “These days, everyone agrees that a **more eclectic approach** to capital account liberalization is required.”

Jagdish Bhagwati (1998) “substantial gains [from open capital accounts] have been **asserted, not demonstrated** ...”

J.M. Keynes (1933) “I sympathize ... with those who would minimize rather than those who would maximize economic entanglements among nations. ... above all, **let finance be national**.”

Open Capital Accounts

Benefits

Costs

Open Capital Accounts

Benefits

- Discipline Policy

- Attract Foreign

Investment

- Domestic

Finance

Costs

Open Capital Accounts

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Open Capital Accounts

Benefits

- Discipline Policy and promote stability through greater credibility
- Attract Knowledgeable Foreign Investment and aid technology transfer.
- Develop Domestic Finance and help domestic consumers of finance.
- Discipline Policy but hamper stabilization policies.
- Attract Footloose Foreign Investment and whipsaw the economy.
- Threaten Domestic Finance with foreign competition

Costs

Open Capital Accounts

Benefits

- Discipline Policy and promote stability through greater credibility
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• **Smooth Consumption**

• **Diversify Risk**

Costs

- Discipline Policy but hamper stabilization policies.
- Attract Footloose Foreign Investment and whipsaw the economy.
- Threaten Domestic Finance with foreign competition

1. Why?

Macroeconomic Preconditions for Investing Abroad:

Question to confront

1. Why are there preconditions for investment (and not trade)?

Answer: Loans require an infrastructure to be effective.

The Need for Infrastructure: Inherent Risks in Finance

- Concerns with Financial Systems because of
 - information asymmetries
 - transactions costs
- These lead to **adverse selection & moral hazard**.
- **Adverse Selection** – don't join a club that would have you as its member
- **Moral Hazard** – why bother?

Risks in an International Setting

- Concerns with Financial Systems more pronounced in international lending and borrowing;
 - Regulation more difficult
 - Information sketchier
 - Exchange Rate Concerns
 - Lender of last resort may be limited.
 - Mismatch of assets & liabilities

Ways to Limit Capital Mobility

1. Administrative or direct controls

Chile – minimum stay requirement on inflows

Malaysia – prohibit non-resident purchases

2. Market-based or indirect controls

Multiple exchange rate regime

Brazil – “entrance” tax on capital inflows

Chile, Colombia, Thailand – Unremunerated Reserve Requirements (URR)

Efficacy of Capital Controls

Less efficacious if

- Sophisticated financial markets (Brazil)
- Not comprehensive
 - Chile – efforts to avoid inflow controls led to expansion of coverage.
 - Malaysia – most comprehensive outflow controls, but also cut off FDI and led to high risk premium for ringgit
- **Administrative Costs, Scope for Corruption.**

2. *What?*

Macroeconomic Preconditions for Investing Abroad:

Question to confront

2. What are these preconditions?

Answers:

- a. Macroeconomic Stability (Crisis)**
- b. Institutions (Growth)**

Macroeconomic Stability and Investing Abroad

- Possible Macroeconomic Risks
 - Exchange Rate risk
 - Asset Price risk
- Either of these can have adverse consequences at time of a crisis and may not be fully hedged.
- **Consideration**, if not **Precondition** for investing abroad

Institutions and Investing Abroad

- Role of Institutions for Growth
 - Economic Infrastructure
 - Financial Institutions
 - Clear Legal Rules
 - Enforceable Rules and Contracts
- **Long-Run Growth**, and Desirability of Investment, Promoted by Institutions.
 - **Interaction** of Institutions with Liberalization.
- Consideration for **long-horizon** placement.

3. How?

**Macroeconomic Preconditions
for Investing Abroad:**

Questions to confront

3. How do these matter (empirics)?

Answers:

Leading Indicators of Crises

Institutions and Growth

Leading Indicators of Exchange Rate Crises

Leading Indicators of Crises

Common “Early Warning Signs” include measures of

- **Fundamentals:**
 - Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation
 - High Money Growth
- **Vulnerabilities**
 - Low level of International Reserves
 - High level of External Debt Commitments
 - Banking System Fragility
- **Market Sentiment**
 - Widening Interest Differentials

Success of Leading Indicators

Pre-Asian Crisis: Best models predicted $\frac{1}{2}$ of crises “in sample” and $\frac{1}{3}$ “Out of Sample.” (but “False Positives”).

Asian Crisis – some indicators (e.g. CA deficits, banking failures, asset price bubbles) pointed towards crisis, but not many people predicted the crisis. With Leading Indicators;

- **Thailand and Malaysia** – crises driven by fundamentals.
- **Korea and Indonesia** in zone of *vulnerability*, crises not driven **exclusively** by fundamentals.
- **Philippines** – crisis not predicted by model.

Capital Account Openness, Institutions and Growth

A \cap -Shaped Relationship Between Open Capital Markets and Economic Growth

Background:

- Empirical determinants of economic growth.
- Mixed results concerning open capital accounts
- Recent Research: Open capital markets significantly beneficial for “needy” (i.e. middle income, but not rich) countries that have institutions in place

Rational for a \cap -Shaped Relationship

- **Poor countries** may not have the constellation of regulatory, political and institutional structures needed to properly intermediate capital flows.
- **Rich countries** - capital account openness is relatively “small potatoes” (with some exceptions, e.g. Norway develops oil extraction in 1970s).
 - Already **well-diversified**, as compared to emerging market countries, so less to gain from an increase in global risk-sharing.
 - Little to gain from “**indirect effects**” of open capital accounts, e.g. technology transfer, financial depth, good governance.

Empirics Analysis

Estimate Cross Country relationship

$$\Delta \ln Y_{76-95,i} = \beta_1 K_i + \beta_2 (K_i \cdot \ln Y_{76,i}) + \beta_3 (K_i \cdot \ln Y_{76,i}^2) + \beta_0 Z_i' + \varepsilon_i$$

Consider partial derivative w.r.t. capital account openness indicator, K_i

$$B_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \ln Y_{1976,i} + \beta_3 \ln Y_{1976,i}^2$$

(Income is a proxy for institutional quality; later consider indicators of institutional quality.)

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Effect of Share on Growth
 Upper Bound, 95% Conf. Interval
 Lower Bound, 95% Conf. Interval




Figure 1, Share, Quadratic Interaction w/GDP per capita

Cross-Country Indicators of Institutional Quality

- Rule of Law
- Government Efficiency
- Control of Corruption

These are all significantly correlated
with income per capita.

Correlation of Government Quality Indicators with Initial Income per Capita

$$\text{Regressions } G_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln Y_{1976,i} + \varepsilon_i$$

G_i	Rule of Law	Government Efficiency	Control of Corruption
α_1	0.594	0.598	0.648
(s.e.)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.046)
R^2	0.663	0.693	0.713
# of Obs	84	79	78

Bold = significant at better than 95% level of confidence.

Estimated B_i

(Effect of Cap. Acc't Openness on Econ. Growth)

for various indicators of Institutional Quality

$$B_i = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \ln Y_{1976,i} + \beta_3 \ln Y_{1976,i}^2$$

Rule of Law

Effect of Share on Growth
Upper Bound, 95% Conf. Interval
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


Figure 3, Share, Quadratic Interaction with Rule of Law

Government Efficiency

Effect of Share on Growth
Upper Bound, 95% Conf. Interval
Lower Bound, 95% Conf. Interval




Figure 5, Share, Quad. Int. with Government Efficiency

Control of Corruption

Effect of Share on Growth
 Lower Bound, 95% Conf. Interval
 Upper Bound, 95% Conf. Interval




Figure 7, Share, Quadratic Interaction w/Control of Corruption

Conclusions

- Macroeconomic and Institutional Preconditions important for translating capital flows into productive investment.
- Capital flows distinct from goods flows.
- Macroeconomic Stability promotes productive investment.
- Early Warning signals may help predict crises
- Open Capital Accounts can promote growth if institutional frameworks in place.
- Broad constellation of factors may be needed.