Draft, November 2001

 

 

 

 

Report No……. ET

 

 

 

Ethiopia

Woreda Studies

 

 

Volume I: The Main Phase

 

 

 

November 2001

 

 

World Bank Country Office in Ethiopia

Country Department 6

Africa Region

 

 

 

 

 

Document of the World Bank

 

 


 


ABBREVIATIONS

 

AAA

Analytical and Advisory Activities

MEDaC

Ministry Economic Development and Cooperation

ACSI

Amhara Credit and Savings Institution

MGZ

Misrak Gojam Zone

ACF

Action Contra la Faim

NCBP

National  Capacity  Building Program

ADLI

Agricultural Development Led Industrialization

NFSP

National Fertilizer Sector Project

ADP

Area Development Program

NGO

Nonovernmental Organization

ANRS

Amhara National Regional State

ODC

Orgut Dangaro Culsulting

BICA

Baseline Information Collection and Analysis

O & M

Operations and Maintenance

BoA

Bureau of Agriculture

PADETS

Participatory Development and Extension Training System

BoPEd

Bureau of Planning and Economic Development

PCC

Program Coordinating Committee

BoTI

Bureau of Trade and Industry

PMU

Program Management Unit

CBDSD

Capacity Building for Decentralized Service Delivery

PRA

Participant Rural Appraisal

CBO

Community Based Organization

PSU

Program Support Unit

CDD

Community-Driven Development

SC

Service Cooperative

CFW

Cash for Work

SIDA

Swedish International Development Agency

CHA

Community Health Agent

SMC

School Management Committee

CIP

Children in Program

SMS

Subject Matter Specialist

CSRP

Civil Service Reform Program

SNNPR

Southern Nations Nationalities Peoples Region

DA

Development  Agent

SORDU

Southern Rangelands Development Unit

DOPED

Department of Planning and Economic Development

SDPs

Sector Development  Programs

DPPB

Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Bureau

SWC

Soil and Water Conservation

EAF

Emergency HIV/AIDS Fund

TBA

Traditional Birth Attendant

EC

Ethiopian Calendar

TCC

Technical Committee

EFY

Ethiopian Fiscal Year

TOR

Terms of Reference

EGS

Employment Generation Schemes

UNCDF

United Nations  Capital Development Fund

EMSAP

Ethiopia Multi-Sect oral HIV/AIDS Program

UNDP

United Nation Development Program

EPRDF

Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front

USAID

United States Aid

ESDP

Education Sector Development Program

USD

United States Dollars

ESRDF

Ethiopia Social Rehabilitation and Development Fund

VAC

Vitamin A Capsule

ETB

Ethiopian Birr

VAD

Vitamin A Deficiency

EU

European  Union 

WAB

Woreda Agriculture Bureau

FFW

Food for Work

WAO

Woreda Agriculture Office

FHI

Freedom for Hunger International

WDC

Woreda Development Committee

GOE

Government of Ethiopia

WDF

Woreda Development Fund

GR

Gracious Relief

WEDO

Woreda Economic Development Office

HSDP

Health Sector Development Program

WPC

Woreda Project Committee

ICBTF

Italian Capacity Building Trust Fund

WS

Woreda Studies

IDA

Internacional  Development Asociación

WUC

Water User Committee

IFSP-SG

Integrated Food Security Program – South Gonder

WEDO

Woreda Economic Development Office

IMF

International Monetary Fund

WV

World Vision

INGO

International Nongovernmental Organizations

ZDCC

Zonal Development Coordinating Committee

KDA

Konso Development Association

ZEB

Zonal Education Bureau

KDO

Konso Democratic Organization

ZPC

Zonal Project Committee

 


Contents – Volume 1

Executive Summary................................................................................................... i-vi

 

1.      Delivering Basic Services in Ethiopia: The Challenge....................................................... 1

 

2.      Decentralization: Opportunities and Risks........................................................................ 3

 

3.      Constitutional Provisions for Decentralization in Ethiopia.................................................. 6

 

4.      The Context of the Woreda Studies................................................................................ 8

 

5.      The Key Hypothesis.................................................................................................... 13

 

6.      The Methodology and the Conduct of the Study............................................................. 14

 

7.      Decentralization and Service Delivery in the Nine Woredas ........................................... 18

 

         A.     The Formal Structures of Decentralized Governance............................................. 18

         B.      Planning............................................................................................................. 21

C.           Resource Management....................................................................................... 34

D.           Service Delivery................................................................................................. 53

 

8.      An Assessment of Government Performance ............................................................... 71

 

         A.     The Nature of the Government’s Response.......................................................... 71

B.           Evaluating the Response...................................................................................... 73

C.           Policy Implications.............................................................................................. 76

 

9.      Further Work .............................................................................................................. 80

 

Boxes

 

6.1     Methodology and Methods............................................................................................ 15

7.1     Formal Planning Procedures in 1998-99........................................................................ 21

7.2     Farm Africa in Konso.................................................................................................. 29

7.3     Gender Issues in Community Planning and Decisionmaking............................................ 33

7.4     The SIDA Block Grant Program in Awabel Woreda...................................................... 44

7.5     Budget Formulation in Amhara, Southern Nations, and Oromiya Regions in 1998-99......... 47

7.6     Shortages of O&M for Schools and Water Schemes, Sodo Zuria Woreda....................... 61

7.7     Participation as an Accountability Mechanism: Underexploited Resource?....................... 65

 

Figures

 

7.1     Woreda Shares of Zonal Population and Zonal Transfers, 1998-99.................................. 40

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tables

 

7.1     Needs Identification at Kebele and Sub-kebele Levels in SNPR, 1998-99........................ 23

7.2         Ranked Development Priorities in Three Communities, 1998-99...................................... 24

7.3         Projects in Four Kebeles, 1998-99.............................................................................. 25-6

7.4         Amhara Region—Capital Projects Requested by Three Woredas, 1998-99................... 26-7

7.5        Oromiya Region—Capital Projects Requested by Three Woredas, 1998-997

7.6         Farta Woreda Soil and Water Conservation Plan, 1998-99.............................................. 29

7.7         Assigned Sources of Revenue and Responsibility for Collection...................................... 35

7.8         Revenues as a Proportion of Expenditures in Nine Woredas, 1998-99.............................. 35

7.9         Composition of Woreda Own Revenues, 1998-99........................................................... 36

7.10      Main Sources of Own Revenues by Percentage, Seven Woredas, 1998-99...................... 37

7.11      Percentage Shares of Population and Transfers, 1998-99................................................ 39

7.12      Vertical Transmission of Transfers, 1998-99.................................................................. 41

7.13      Per Capita Revenue and Expenditure Patterns for Nine Woredas, 1998-999.................... 46

7.14      Share of Salaries in Nine Woreda Budgets, 1998-99....................................................... 48

7.15      Sectoral Composition of Recurrent Expenditures, 1998-99.............................................. 49

7.16      Number of  Technical Woreda Staff in Selected Sectors, 1998-99................................... 54

7.17      Access to Basic Services in Fifteen Kebeles, 1999-2000…………………………… ..55-6

7.18      Constructing a Veterinary Clinic in Farta, Amhara, 1998-99…………............................. 66

7.19      Constructing DA Houses and Centers in Tach Gaynt, Amhara, 1998-99.......................... 66

7.20      Constructing Primary Schools in Liben, Oromiya, 1998-997…………………………..… 66

7.21      Implementation Responsibilities for Capital Projects under the Education and  Health Sector Development Programs in Farta and Tach Gaynt Woredas, Amhara, 1998-99......................................................... 67

9.1      Technical Staffing and Vacancies in Selected Sectors, Eight Woredas, 2000.................... 81

 

 

Contents – Volumes 2 and 3

Annexes

 

1.         Terms of Reference for the Main Phase

2.         The Pilot: Awabel Woreda

3.         The Experiences of Selected Donors/NGOs in Rural Service Delivery

4.         Handling Hierarchy in Decentralized Settings: School Governance in Tikur Inchini


Prologue

 

The Woreda Studies were carried out by a team of World Bank Country Office staff and consultants with assistance from officials of the Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia (Chief Economic Adviser’s Office) and the Federal Ministry of Development and Economic Cooperation, and with support from Action Aid, the Canadian International Development Agency, UNDP, and the EU.  The studies seek to relate official Ethiopian decentralization policies to the actual practice of rural development in nine case woredas, examining development from the perspectives of public sector planning, resource management, and service delivery.

 

Field work was conducted between November 1999 and September 2000. The team was led by Joanne Raisin (consultant) and Abebaw Alemayehu from the World Bank Country Office in Ethiopia. The final report was compiled by Nigel Roberts. In addition, In mid-2001, a review of bilateral and INGO support for decentralized service delivery was carried out by Tegegne Gebre Egziabher and is included in Volume II. A pilot study of governance in education in one woreda was conducted in  early 2000, and appears as Volume III.


Executive Summary

1.         Delivering basic services in Ethiopia is a formidable task. Much of Ethiopia remains inaccessible, underserved, and potentially unstable. The country is notable for its sheer size, its physical and ethnic diversity, its dependence on a volatile agricultural economy, and for the grinding poverty that exists alongside heightened popular expectations of change. In addition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has committed itself to a radical new brand of ethnicallybased regional decentralization. The Woreda Studies (the Study) illustrate how hard it is to develop accountable government and reduce poverty under such circumstances.

 

2.         The Study shows that the Federal Government and its Regional counterparts still rely heavily on traditional hierarchical approaches to development. The system in place is characterized by administrative deconcentration, not the devolution of powers to elected bodies provided for in the Federal and regional constitutions. It makes use of established bureaucratic disciplines and a tradition of popular compliance with authority.

 

3.         In view of the complexities it faces and the shortage of resources at its disposal, this approach is pragmatic and understandable – but it carries a price. First and most important, it inhibits the development of democratic accountability at the local level and dampens the latent capabilities of communities and of other service providers. Second, the service delivery model in use is staff-intensive and rigid, and maintaining it consumes too high a portion of the scant resources available for development.

 

4.         The findings suggest that Ethiopia should build on its existing system of governance.  It could do this by increasing the accountability of service providers to beneficiaries and by encouraging communities to engage as active partners in service delivery.

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5.         In the 1970s, the Derg Regime bypassed Ethiopia’s traditional community organizations in creating modern participatory structures. These highly centralized structures extended to the grassroots level and provided a mechanism both for service delivery and for the exercise of political control. This is the system which the EPRDF inherited and which it has put to use. 

 

6.         The formal authority entrusted to these representative structures under the Federal and regional constitutions of 1995 is considerable, and the constitutional and legal basis for devolution of power is thus in place. In a fiscal sense, moreover, the Federal Government has devolved a high degree of spending authority to regional governments and has allocated them a major share of the national budget.

 

7.         In reality, the system of governance is still highly centralized. The Study revealed this through an examination of the practice of decentralization in three key areas of economic development activity: planning, resource management, and program implementation.

 

8.         Planning at the local level is largely subordinated to national and regional priorities. Most plan resources available for woredas and kebeles are spoken for by the recurrent budget needs of the civil service, over which local governments have no say.  Where off-plan resources are available (emergency food/cash funds, donor and international NGO contributions), these are generally programmed by outside agencies. Local governments are generally left to focus on the planning of capital projects, but capital budgets are very limited – ranging between US$0.16 and $2.60 per capita in the Study woredas in 1998-99. Capital project selection, moreover, is ultimately determined by civil servants at the zonal level, where priority is given to sector ministry objectives and to the national Five-Year Plan. It is true that community capacity to participate in planning is limited, and interest muted. This may reflect skepticism at the process, however – much greater enthusiasm was witnessed in relation to certain participatory pilot exercises. The Study found no evidence that traditional community structures were tapped in planning; labor power, not ideas, appears to be the main contribution sought from communities. Groups with little voice, in particular pastoralists and women, are not specifically catered to in the planning cycle.

 

9.         Resource management is largely controlled by the bureaucracy. Federal transfers account for two-thirds of woreda expenditures, and budget preparation and management are mainly handled by the bureaucracy -- elected representatives and community groups focus more on tax collection and labor mobilization. Budgeting conventions further loosen expectations of local resource management control: local revenues are applied to recurrent budgets (which local governments do not allocate), rather than to the capital budget (which in principle they do). The shortage of budgeting and accounting skills in the civil service, and their virtual absence among elected officials, are a major constraint to effective budget formulation or management at the woreda level, as well as to meaningful civic participation in public resource management. Although formal reviews of the budget are held annually by woreda councils, the sanctioning of those who abuse their budgetary authority normally derives from internal investigations rather than from accountability to the public.

 

10.       Citizens are passive beneficiaries of public service delivery rather than active participants in its management. The Ethiopian service delivery model is based on area coverage and direct service provision by cadres of professional staff, and their salaries account for the bulk of public development resources (over 60 percent in most Study woredas). As mentioned above, capital resources are scarce, as are operating costs; this imbalance reflects a clearlystated Federal focus on increasing primary enrollments and the numbers of farmers reached by the extension service, and has impacted service quality quite seriously. The traditional community structures prevalent in Ethiopian life play little part in formal service delivery, and the  capacity, leadership, and resources embodied in them lie untapped by the official development effort. Apart from site selection and the contracting of individual artisans, communities and user groups exercise little discretion over Government staff, procurement processes, or service evaluation. Channels for complaint, while formally present, are little used.

 

11.       In summary, hierarchical control is strong, the formal development process is directed in detail by the technical bureaucracy and local/alternative energies are under-used.

 

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12.       Why does a system which so strongly empowers elected structures operate in this hierarchical manner?  That it does reflects  the historical legacy, weak institutional structures, and a lack of capacity. The situation also attests to the role of the ruling EPRDF in development. In today’s Ethiopia, the Party exercises considerable leadership and control throughout local government, as respondents at all levels acknowledged..

 

13.       When the EPRDF came to power in 1991, it inherited expectations and realities that it could not ignore. There was demand for a new relationship between the center and the peripheries, one that reversed extractive practices and recognized regional and ethnic aspirations. There was demand for a restoration of basic services and for improved rural welfare. The context was one in which traditional structures had been sidelined and the nascent rural private sector destroyed. Nor could rural instability and law and order concerns be ignored. Out of these realities emerged the current federalist political structure and the Government’s Agricultural-Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy. It is ADLI that provides the economic rationale for a strong public presence in service provision, awaiting the emergence of  a vigorous private market.

 

14.       The means at the Government’s disposal were meager. The Government must work with a low fiscal base, a suffering and poorly educated population, and a civil service made hesitant by years of politicization.

 

15.       Government strategy under these circumstances mixes commitment to eventual decentralization and economic democracy with a reliance for the time being on authoritarian practice. This hierarchical approach has permitted a strong budgetary emphasis on key ADLI priorities, in particular universal primary education and increased agricultural production, with impressive results through the mid-1990s. The civil service remains welldisciplined, and absenteeism and fraud are rare by any standardsFunds in the Study woredas appear to flow on time and to the purposes intended. Considerable stores of community labor power are tapped for their own benefit.

 

16.       But these achievements come with a price. Foremost among these is stifling of the development of the woreda as a democratic, accountable unit of government, and – associated with this – a failure to capture the resourcefulness, resilience and adaptability of Ethiopian communities. Second is the related self-reinforcement of the bureaucracy. Evidence of this is found in the high proportion of development resources devoted to maintaining regional and zonal bureaucratic superstructures and in the strong budgetary preference shown for salary expenditures over either capital projects or operating costs, despite what community preferences appear to indicate. There is also a relationship between the centralized control of service delivery and inflexibility. Service products are uniform in nature, and are not well tailored to different target groups (the poor, pastoralists, women). Valuable lessons that could be learned from bilateral and NGO activities are virtually ignored by the technical bureaus. The private sector, far from being seen as a legitimate complementary channel for service provision, tends to be regarded by officials as undesirable and exploitative. Indications from other sources suggest that the spread of rural entrepreneurship envisaged under ADLI has faltered.

 

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17.       The Study raises questions about the critical path for institutional reform in Ethiopia.  Will it gradually relinquish the short-term advantages of a hierarchical approach and pursue the democratization of service provision and rural development? Or will history and tradition prevail? On balance, the prospects for a positive change seem good. The legal instruments for greater democratization are in place or – in the case of the municipalities – are under enactment. Tax reform should shortly bring a significant increase in resources to local governments. Donor-financed decentralization pilot efforts are showing promise and evincing strong Federal Government interest.

 

18.       The Study proposes a number of actions that would assist in the measured decentralization of power to elected bodies and would enhance community control of development resources. Collectively, these measures seek to refine roles, build human skills and define accountabilities – the better to enable citizens to exercise the rights that their constitutions already accord them. The measures include:

 

·        Introducing unified planning at the woreda level.  This has two dimensions: first, the integration of capital and recurrent budgeting, so that woredas and their elected structures are involved in planning and budgeting the delivery of services as well as capital projects; and, second, the integration of all public resources into the planning process, including donor/NGO contributions and emergency food and cash resources.

 

·        Developing transparent formulae for determining subregional transfers. A formula-based system should replace the current adhoc approach to determining how much of the federal subsidy should go to each zone and woreda, and the extent to which it should be offset to account for aid resources (including emergency food and cash). These formulae should be clearly explained to elected bodies and the public.

 

·        Upgrading planning skills at woreda and kebele levels. If planning is to involve elected representatives and community groups in any meaningful way, the technical capacity of the public to appreciate and participate in planning must be improved. This can be done in the short term by ensuring full staffing of Government planning and finance positions at the zonal and woreda levels then ensuring that these experts provide insitu training to woreda and kebele officials.

·        Introducing modern civil service legislation and other formal rules.  A modern legal framework would provide the basis for a client- and service-oriented public administration.  It would help clarify the roles of political and technical actors, as well as those of the executive and legislature within regions and woredas.  Furthermore, a new Code of Conduct and Citizen’s Charter of Rights and Responsibilities give a clear idea of what the public should expect from the civil service, and would help create a clear sense of citizen entitlement and recourse.

 

·        Introducing annual woreda-level assessments of service delivery performance in priority sectors. These should be conducted by the woreda councils and serve as an audit of the public and donor/INGO services provided in a particular woreda.

 

·        Reviewing, refining, and expanding woreda grant schemes. A number of approaches are being tried.  These include the SIDA, UNCDF, and ESRDF-financed woreda-based schemes, as well as sector-specific block grants (under the Bank-financed HIV/AIDS Program and the proposed Food Security Program). All aim to devolve greater control over resources to elected local structures. There is a need to compare experiences, refine models, and replicate those showing promise. 

 

·        Expanding community management of specific institutions or services. Another approach to decentralization is to give communities greater control over service facilities. School management committees, once they meet certain standards for reporting and public information provision, could be given responsibility for managing teachers and school budgets. Similar powers could be delegated to comparable health post and veterinary clinic management committees.

 

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19.       The Bank is proposing to partner the Government and the donor/NGO community in a comprehensive, long-term program of work on decentralization and service delivery.  Many such initiatives could be advanced under this umbrella.  As an initial step, the Bank is supporting the preparation of a Capacity Building for Decentralized Service Delivery (CBDSD) Project to support key public management reforms (for example, wage policy and budgeting reforms) as well as the restructuring of specific agencies at the Federal level and in some regions.  The project would also help woredas and municipalities take on more responsibility for their own development.  Lessons drawn from the preparation and early implementation of the CBDSD Project would provide a basis for a longer-term program of supportfor regional governance and service delivery.

 

 

 

 

1.      Delivering Basic Services in Ethiopia: The Challenge

1.01     The Federal Government of Ethiopia faces formidable challenges in overseeing the delivery of basic services. Ethiopia’s feudal regime was followed in 1974 by twenty years of civil disruption, and efforts in the 1990s to reform economic management and meet the needs of the population have been set back in the past three years by an expensive war with Eritrea, a severe episode of drought, and a deterioration in Ethiopia’s international terms of trade[1]. Ethiopia, one of the oldest continuous civilizations in the world, is also one of the most destitute of all nations. Basic infrastructure provision (miles of road per capita, access to clean water) fares poorly compared to other low-income countries[2], as do social indicators (life expectancy, adult literacy, combined school enrollments, and gender equality[3]). Ethiopia’s population, currently almost 63 million, is projected to grow by almost 50 percent in the next 15 years[4]. The needs of this poor, expanding population for schooling, clean water, health services, access to markets, and agricultural technology are formidable.  Despite the Government’s efforts to restore spending levels in poverty-related areas since the end of the 1999-2000 border conflict, the fiscal base remains weak, and aggregate scarcity is pervasive in certain regions.  Furthermore, institutional and capacity weaknesses at all level of government contribute to delayed fiscal transfers to regions, structural imbalances between the recurrent and development sides of sectoral budgets, and poor civil service wages, all of which undermine the service delivery improvements achieved through the 1990s.

 

1.02     Along with this disparity between needs and means Ethiopia faces the additional complexities of great geographic and ethnic diversity, as well as an almost total dependence on rain-fed agriculture which exposes the population to constant production and market uncertainties. Most of the population lives in mountainous areas, traditionally isolated from the outside world and from neighboring communities. This diversity finds economic expression in Ethiopia’s varied livelihood systems: the settled upland teff cultures of the north; the enset-based farming systems of the south; and a variety of agro-pastoralist and nomadic systems along the margins of the Rift Valley. Each of these ways of life has its own particular socioeconomic dynamic and combination of service needs. Crucial to the nature of modern Ethiopia are the historical political tensions between the unitary impulse and the aspirations of the country’s different ethnic groups were parlayed into the model of federalism adopted in the Ethiopian Constitution of 1994. Under this governance system, prime responsibility for the delivery of basic services falls to the governments of the nine regional states and two special city administrations, albeit largely financed by Federal subsidy and conforming in practice to policy directions and standards established at the Federal level. Implementation of this distinct vision of decentralization has involved the transfer of large numbers of staff to the regions, and an ongoing process of assigning responsibilities to different tiers of Government -- a process in which disruption and discontinuity is inevitable, and evident.


2.  Decentralization: Opportunities and Risks

2.01          In the last quarter of the twentieth century, a growing number of developed and developing countries have embarked on decentralization policies.  The forces behind this worldwide trend towards localization and toward the specific shifting of significant fiscal, administrative, and political authority to subnational levels are myriad and complex.  Often, larger political dynamics related to the process of democratization have compelled governments such as those in Latin America to decentralize formerly autocratic, centralized regimes.  In many parts of Africa, decentralization is driven by the transition to multi-party democracy as well as by the aspirations of diverse ethnic groups for greater voice in decisionmaking. In other settings, governments have viewed decentralization as a largely technocratic exercise, partially in recognition of the shortcomings of centralized forms of public administration in terms of allocative and operational efficiency.

2.02          Regardless of how and why they emerge, decentralization processes are replete with opportunities as well as risks, benefits as well as potential costs.  In the most general terms, decentralization allows good politics and good economics to come together.[5]  It achieves this by enhancing political responsiveness and participation at the local level while simultaneously furthering economic objectives, for instance by improving the allocative and operational efficiency of public expenditures.  When designed appropriately, decentralization can help governments better allocate financial and human resources in accordance with local preferences (for example, spending more money on education rather than roads, or on more teachers rather than classroom expansion) and also can customize essential services in line with local tastes.  Another potential benefit is that decentralized governance arrangements tend to generate stronger accountability relationships downwards to clients and beneficiaries.  Frequently, local jurisdictions—empowered with the authority to carry out service delivery—will also start competing with each other to better serve citizens, who “vote with their feet.”[6]  Aside from its purported economic advantages, fiscal and administrative decentralization—as noted above—can also serve broader political objectives.  These may include increasing the scope of popular participation, extending the reach of legitimate authority, and enhancing the credibility and stability of state institutions.

2.03          Notwithstanding its potential payoffs in terms of improving efficiency, accountability, client satisfaction, and popular legitimacy, decentralization also comes with its share of risks.  For example, when central governments fail to reduce spending or increase taxes to match the increasing cost of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, they risk macrostability in the form of recurring central government deficits..  In addition, macrofiscal performance may be compromised because central authorities have less ability to influence the overall level of public sector revenues and expenditures.  Local authorities may also use their new influence to borrow excessively in expectation of bailouts from the center.  Problems of contingent liabilities, poor budget execution, and resource leakage can further exacerbate aggregate fiscal indiscipline in the context of decentralization.  A second major risk lies in the likely disparities that may emerge between subnational jurisdictions.  Poorer regions or districts are not likely to fare as well as wealthier ones, both in terms of effective demand for essential services, which varies with income, and in terms of spending, which reflects variations in the local tax bases.  To safeguard against the risks of decentralization, it is important to put in place both incentives for local governments to maintain sound fiscal performance,  and minimum baseline standards for service delivery inputs and outputs..

2.04          Leveraging the benefits of decentralization while minimizing the risks requires that governments implement the following design principles:

(i)                  Link fiscal authority—specifically, expenditure and revenue assignments—at the margin to the service provision responsibilities and functions of local government so that local politicians can bear the costs of their decisions and deliver on their promises;

(ii)                Put mechanisms in place for communities to express their preferences in a way that is binding on the politicians, creating a credible incentive for people to participate;

(iii)               Inform local communities about the costs of services and service delivery options, as well as the resource envelope and its sources, so the decisions they make are meaningful.

(iv)              Create an administrative system in which technical cadres are assigned to, and primarily accountable to, political executives within a subnational jurisdiction.

(v)                Establish a robust fiduciary and accountability framework, in addition to traditional government oversight institutions, that generates public and transparent information on the financial and physical performance of the local government, and encourages citizens to seek remedies to performance problems;

(vi)              Set up a system of minimum standards for the inputs and outputs of service delivery in order to ensure that a basic level of services is provided  across subnational units.

2.05     Since 1995, Ethiopia has sought to establish a system of federated government based on many of the design principles described above. As the Bank’s  Regionalization Study[7] remarks, “one of the underlying arguments for fiscal federalism is that assigning expenditure responsibilities and decisionmaking powers to lower levels of government can improve a state’s ability to efficiently identify and address its citizens’ needs. Being closer to the beneficiary population, lower levels of government have an informational advantage over the Federal Government as they can better see their constituents’ needs. They also know the local conditions that are important in internalizing benefits and costs of public service provision. Moreover, local governments have a greater incentive to improve service delivery, beneficiaries and citizen groups can easily monitor their actions and evaluate them through local elections, etc.”

2.06     Most conventional arguments for decentralization stress the potential balance that can be achieved between hierarchy and participation in service delivery. Thus, active community participation in planning, resource management, and the delivery of services can help ensure that local institutions set priorities which respond to and implement the needs and wishes of potential recipients.  Meanwhile, strong financial and personnel management from within the civil service helps promote objective standards of behavior among Government staff, and encourages the orderly flow and disposition of public funds. In other words, the top-down enforcement of rules in combination with bottom-up pressures from communities can act in concert to enhance probity and accountability in local service delivery organizations.


3.  Constitutional Provisions for Decentralization in Ethiopia

3.01     The Bank’s Regionalization Study provides a useful introduction to Ethiopia’s federal structure. It describes Ethiopia’s post-Derg strategy as one aiming to “secure balanced regional progress” and “based on the principle of participatory development with involvement from the highest [federal] to the lowest [woreda] levels of government…. There is strong belief in the principle that a decision-making process that includes all nationalities and ethnic groups is key to sustained national development.”

 

3.02     The Ethiopian Federal Constitution of 1995 established a four-tier system of government. The regions are divided into 66 zones, 550 woredas, and  6 special woredas. The woreda is considered the key level of local government. The average woreda population is around 100,000. Most urban areas are governed by a parallel system of municipal government whose institutional structures, rights, and responsibilities were assigned by law during the 1940s. Unlike the woredas, the municipalities do not receive any fiscal transfers from higher levels of government. The municipalities were not considered in this study, but are the subject of another parallel piece of Bank work: Municipal Decentralization in Ethiopia: A Rapid Assessment[8].

 

3.03     The Federal Constitution reveals a strong preference for an activist, welfare state- oriented government that is heavily involved in providing social and economic infrastructure for development. Article 90 (1) states that “to the extent the country’s resources permit, policies shall aim to provide all Ethiopians access to public health and education, clean water, housing, food and social security.”  Resources, of course, do not permit full public provision;  moreover, it is also very important to note that  responsibility for a service does not mean a government need necessarily provide it.

 

3.04     Extensive powers are assigned to the regions in modern Ethiopia. Each region can establish a government that advances self-rule and democracy in accordance with the Federal Constitution.  That regional government is empowered to write its own constitution and manage its internal social, developmental, security, and economic affairs. The functions assigned to the Federal Government are national in scope: monetary policy, foreign relations, defense. In addition to implementing policies with nationwide benefits, federal ministries are expected to support their regional counterparts by undertaking research, collecting data, and providing technical assistance and advice.

 

3.05     The Regionalization Study identifies three aspects of regional discretion in Ethiopia:

 

(i)                  The first aspect concerns the allocation of responsibilities and discretion over expenditure. The regions are given the bulk of the responsibility for managing local infrastructure and service provision. Within sectors, expenditure responsibilities are allocated to the lowest level of government presumed able to pay for and use the service. Thus, in principle, the Federal Government builds and maintains national highways, the regions build interzonal rural roads, the zones build small inter-woreda roads, and the woredas build tracks and paths; the regions run specialized clinics, the zones referral hospitals, and the woredas health centers and health posts; the regions establish educational curricula and construction/teacher standards, the zones oversee school construction, and the woredas attend to the management of individual schools. 

 

(ii)                The second aspect concerns the allocation of revenue-raising powers.   The nature of ownership determines whether taxes are paid to the federation or the regions.

 

(iii)               The third aspect concerns the design of the transfer system.  This system bridges the gap (“vertical imbalance”) between the expenditure requirements and the revenue-generation capacities of each level of government[9].

 

3.06     In Ethiopia, there is a large vertical imbalance between the revenue-raising powers of the Federation and the expenditure responsibilities of the regions; as the Regionalization Study says, “the present distribution of tax revenue is heavily tilted towards the Federal Government in Ethiopia, while expenditure responsibilities have been….extensively decentralized,” the result being that regional governments have in the past few years been able to finance, on average, only some 30 percent of their expenditures from their own resources. The remaining 70 percent “is bridged by unconditional block grants determined on ‘objective’ factors such as population, development levels and local revenue generation, rather than the effective fulfillment of certain tasks.”

 

3.07     The Regionalization Study characterizes decentralization in Ethiopia as a “bold and thoughtful process…. supported by a widely shared consensus over both development strategy and objectives, and very large transfers of untied resources from the federal government to the regions.”

 

 


4.    The Context of the Woreda Studies

4.01     In the initial period following the overthrow of the Derg in 1991, the Bank focused on support for postwar demobilization and reconstruction, economic reform and the financing of basic infrastructure.  Direct involvement in grassroots service delivery was limited largely to support for the Ethiopian Social and Rehabilitation Development Fund, ESRDF, which depends on the mobilization of local beneficiaries to finance and assist with the implementation of small-scale capital works (schools, health facilities, water systems, and irrigation schemes). As the economy stabilized and as first-generation reforms took hold, the Bank’s program shifted emphasis toward the composition and quality of public expenditures, and a series of vertical sector investment programs were put in place in the late 1990s. Some of these, for example the Agriculture Research and Training Project (FY98), provide conventional project support to core Federal institutions, while others – in particular the multi-donor Education and Health Sector Development Programs (ESDP, FY98, and HSDP, FY99) – aim to provide budget support to national programs delivered primarily at the regional level.

 

4.02     Early implementation of the ESDP and HSDP showed that the Bank’s understanding of decentralized governance and project implementation in Ethiopia was weak. At the same time it was apparent that Ethiopia’s transition to a federal system was proving complex and disruptive, and that inherent weaknesses in planning, budgeting, financial management, procurement, and field supervision had been intensified by the dispersion of responsibilities across the country to a variety of new institutions[10]/. Up to this point, the Bank’s knowledge of the crucial interface between local governance structures and service delivery agencies was limited to experience gained through the ESRDF; the Bank’s knowledge lacked any clear analytical dimension.  A first attempt to chart the territory was made with the Regionalization Study, researched in 1998, which focused on the macrofiscal dimensions of decentralization in Ethiopia.

 

4.03     By 1998, additional factors prompted the Bank to accelerate efforts to achieve a better understanding of governance and service delivery on the front line. The first factor was the Federal Government’s decision to engage the Bank as a strategic partner in its National Capacity Building Program (NCBP).  The heart of that program is a drive to enhance capacity to deliver decentralized basic services. Beginning in 1998 senior policymakers, in particular the Prime Minister, have asked the Bank to give top strategic priority to capacity building in Ethiopia.  The policymakers now see the Bank’s reincarnation as a “knowledge Bank” as a way to access experience in this sphere from around the globe[11]. A second critical factor is the Bank’s own growing interest in supporting basic service delivery to the poor, and the emergence of a new paradigm for rural development, which in the Bank’s Africa Region is known as the Community-Driven Development (CDD) initiative. This approach arose from an analysis of the failures associated with Bank efforts to support sustainable integrated rural development in the 1970s and 1980s, when integration was largely regarded as a supply-side, top-down effort to coordinate sectoral programs.  CDD initiatives, currently supported in a variety of client countries, seeks to strengthen the demand side of service delivery and good governance by enabling communities—through a combination of untied resource transfers and capacity building—to take the lead in planning and implementing multi-sectoral development efforts.

 

4.04     In June 1999, the prime minister chaired a seminar with Bank staff in which the Government’s draft NCBP and possible Bank responses to this were discussed[12]/. In May 2001, the Government asked the  Bank to consider support for 14 detailed capacity building project proposals, which can be grouped  into three broad categories of activity:  capacity for civil service reform and decentralized service delivery; capacity for private sector development;, and capacity for higher and vocational education. Following the 1999 seminar, the Bank’s analytical and operational research work program in Ethiopia increasingly began to focus on various dimensions of decentralized service delivery and capacity building. Collectively, this body of work now forms the main focus of Bank analytical and advisory (AAA) work in Ethiopia, providing the underpinning for significant potential future IDA lending.

 

4.05     Work Completed or Under Way.  There are a number of Bank-supported initiatives:

 

(i)                  The federal Ministry of Finance/multi-donor Public Expenditure Review 2000  studied public expenditure planning at the regional level. The PER also reviewed examples of service delivery in practice in the health and education sectors.

 

(ii)                Municipal Decentralization in Ethiopia: A Rapid Assessment looked at decentralization in four sample municipalities (Bahir Dar in Amhara Region, Awassa in Southern Nations Region, Gambella town in Gambella Region and Dire Dawa City).  This report complemented the rural perspective of the Woreda Studies and highlighted some of the key issues and opportunities for improving municipal capacity and performance. A draft of this study was completed in July 2001.

 

(iii)               Handling Hierarchy in Decentralized Settings: Governance Underpinnings of School Performance in Tikur Inchini Woreda studies primary education in one woreda. This freestanding contribution to the Woreda Studies, undertaken in mid-2000, reviews decisionmaking, resource allocation, and the perceptions of the local population. The study is attached to the Woreda Studies as Annex 4. 

 

(iv)              The Emergency Recovery Credit (FY01) allows the Bank to support the Government’s effort to implement a comprehensive set of reforms of the public sector. Many of these reforms are of direct relevance to the quality of service delivery on the frontline. They include reforms in civil service management (the drafting of a new Civil Service Law, the production of a civil service Code of Conduct, systematic job regrading leading to medium-term pay reform, and the development of a National Service Delivery Policy); and  reforms in public expenditure management (including adherence to a regular budget calendar and the proper integration of capital and recurrent budgeting).

 

(v)                The Rural Water Supply Project (FY97) engages a number of communities throughout Ethiopia.  This pilot program is designed to enhance community-level control of and responsibility for the planning, construction, and maintenance of water points.

 

(vi)              The Ethiopia Multi-Sectoral HIV/AIDS Program (EMSAP, FY01) creates an Emergency HIV/AIDS Fund (EAF) with a total allocation of US$28.1 million.  The EAF includes a grant window that encourages community efforts to intensify action against HIV/AIDS.  Access rules for the grant, which is administered through woreda HIV/AIDS councils, specify clear eligibility criteria for kebele and woreda participation.  Participating woredas are to receive initial allocations equivalent to US$1000 per kebele, paid in two installments of US$500 each, that will allow them to finance community-operated projects or to buy services from outside providers.

 

4.06     Work Proposed. Future activities include the following, and would be carried out in close partnership with the Government as well as with interested donors (which include including UNDP, EU, USAID, the Government of Italy, and DfID) and NGOs.

 

(i)                  As an initial step in buttressing elements of the Government’s National Capacity Building Program, the Bank is supporting the preparation of a Capacity Building for Decentralized Service Delivery (CBDSD) Project.  This program supports cross-cutting public management reforms (for example, wage policy reform, budgeting) as well as agency-specific restructuring at the Federal level and in some regions.  The project would also encourage restructuring and empowering woredas and municipalities to take on the responsibilities associated with fiscal and administrative decentralization (for example, planning, implementation, accountability).

 

(ii)                In parallel with this, the Bank has offered to finance a Regional Governance and Capacity Building Project (FY03).  This project, working in parallel with the above program, would immediately build on initiatives that are well advanced in their design. The project would be fairly modest in scope and could be eventually followed by a larger operation.

 

(iii)               Complementing these activities, Service Delivery Surveys are planned over the coming months to deepen understanding on how services are perceived, both by public officials and by citizens. The surveys would solicit the views of these two groups on the relevance, efficacy, and probity of Government services.

 

(iv)              A Review of Regional Revenue is proposed over the FY02-03 period. This study would examine federal/regional revenue sharing provisions, explore the potential for additional sources of regional revenue, assess regional tax administration capacity and pilot training for regional tax officers.

 

(v)                A Review of Federal and Regional Pay and Incentive Structures has also been proposed for this FY as an additional Bank input into the civil service reform program;

 

(vi)              Under the proposed Food Security Project (FY02), kebeles would be provided with grants for rural development purposes. These grants would build community capacity to plan and implement development programs, as well as providing them with untied funds to pursue activities of their own choosing. The project would also build the capacity of the woredas, zones, and regions to support this process.

 

4.07     The Italian Capacity Building Trust Fund. The ICBTF is a $3million facility which the Federal Government and the Government of Italy have asked the Bank to manage, in support of the Government’s National Capacity Building Program (para. 4.04). A major plank of the NCBP and of the ICBTF is support for decentralized service delivery. The Regional Revenue Review, the Service Delivery Surveys, and the Review of Federal and Regional Pay and Incentives Structures could be largely financed through this instrument, as  could proposed studies related to Ethiopia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, including a review of the effectiveness of ADLI in the 1990s and the development of functional indicators for measuring the impact of service delivery efforts.

 

4.08     The Woreda Studies should thus be seen as one aspect of a broader set of inquiries. They have their own particular genesis in the Bank Country Director’s wish that the institution should achieve a better understanding of “how ideas flow up and resources down” at the local level. The Studies are intended to contribute to the overall body of knowledge and experience that will be generated through the Bank’s work program. They seek, in particular, to shed light on the interface between governance and service delivery at the woreda level and below. The exercise was also intended as a training tool for the staff of Bank and other donor/international NGO agencies and as a way to expose them to the realities of village-level development.

 

4.09     This draft report will be discussed with the Government in February 2002, along with the two other completed case studies, Municipal Decentralization in Ethiopia: A Rapid Assessment and Handling Hierarchy in Decentralized Settings: Governance Underpinnings of School Performance in Tikur Inchini Woreda. A workshop will also be held February 20, 2002 in Addis to broaden the discussions and seek feedback. The findings from this process will contribute to the design of the subsequent analytical and capacity building tasks described above.

 

 

 

 

 


 

5.  The Key Hypothesis

5.01     The main phase of the Woreda Studies was preceded by a pilot in Awabel Woreda, West Gojam Zone, Amhara Region, in order to test out methodologies and to arrive at some working hypotheses. This initial Woreda Profile can be found in Annex 2.

 

5.02     The pilot study suggested a disconnect between the formal decentralization of powers and authorities envisaged by the Federal and regional constitutions and its exercise in practice. Two important observations contributed to this hypothesis. First, while the Federal Constitution devolves considerable authority over the provision of basic social and economic services to the regions, technical line agencies operating in Awabel in 1998-99 delivered products that conformed closely to the types of service evident throughout the highland areas of the country: thus, for example, the agricultural development agents in the woreda were intent on promoting fertilizer, packages of seed, and credit on half-hectare teff demonstration plots in a manner identical to what could simultaneously be observed in teff-producing areas in Oromiya or Southern Nations Regions. Second, the impetus and authority for development planning, budget management, and project implementation appeared to rest firmly in the hands of the same technical line agencies, with elected local structures and local community interest groups providing quite limited inputs.

 

5.03     In other words, the pilot study suggested that service delivery in Awabel Woreda was characterized by a deconcentration of administrative authority rather than a decentralization of  political power. Put another way, the development process in Awabel presented itself as hierarchical rather than participatory. The Main Phase set out to research this hypothesis further, and to assess the effectiveness of the revealed mode of decisionmaking on local development.

 


6.  Methodology and the Conduct of the Study

6.01     The Woreda Studies intend to provide a snapshot of the development process in the budget year 1998-99 (Ethiopian FY 1991) in a selection of woredas chosen to illustrate certain gross dichotomies in the economic system – urban/rural, food secure/food insecure, agrarian/pastoral. As case studies, their main intent is to reveal process and perception rather than to develop statistically significant conclusions. In effect, they identify behaviors that may warrant further investigation.

 

6.02     The Awabel Woreda Pilot laid the foundation for the research agenda of the Main Phase. Omissions in the Pilot led to the incorporation of a significant community dimension as well as a broadened research agenda and an expanded methodology (see main phase TORs, Annex 1). Nine rural woredas in four regions were visited over a five-month period between May and September 2000:

 

(i)                  Farta Woreda, Amhara Region (food secure agricultural woreda)

(ii)                Tach Gayint Woreda, Amhara Region (food insecure agricultural woreda)

(iii)               Awabel Woreda, Amhara Region (food secure agricultural woreda – revisit)

(iv)              Dubti Woreda, Afar Region (food secure pastoral woreda with an urban center)

(v)                Konso Special Woreda, Southern Nations Region (food insecure agricultural special status woreda)

(vi)              Sodo Zuria Woreda, Southern Nations Region (food secure agricultural woreda)

(vii)             Adami Tulu Woreda, Oromiya Region (food insecure agricultural woreda with an urban center)

(viii)           Agarfa Woreda, Oromiya Region (food secure agricultural woreda)

(ix)              Liben Woreda, Borana, Oromiya Region (food insecure agro-pastoralist woreda)

 

Fieldwork was undertaken at regional, zonal, woreda, kebele, and sub-kebele levels. Discussions took place with representatives of the elected administration, the staff of six sectors bureaus (health, education, water, agriculture, finance and planning), NGOs, and communities.

 

6.04     The methodology for the Woreda Studies was informed by current debates on research methods (Box 6.1). The quantitative and qualitative methods included questionnaires, nondirective interviews, focus group meetings, and simple Participant Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques. The main use of quantitative methods was to gather financial data and information on planning, while qualitative methods were used to shed light on perceptions of decentralization at all levels and to probe the issue of community participation within this process.

 

 

                                                                                   

 

 

 

 

 

Box  6.1:  Methodology and Methods

 

The terms methodology and methods describe the analysis of how research proceeds and the techniques it uses to gather data[13]/ Debate goes on whether qualitative or quantitative data (for example, nondirective interviews or questionnaires) are more useful[14]/. The major strength of quantitative research lies in its ability to encompass large samples; in contrast, qualitative methods and interpretive procedures are clearly weak in this respect – an argument frequently used against case studies. That said, as pointed out by Robert Chambers[15], quantitative data derived from questionnaires has significant limitations when applied to process enquiry, since "their penetration concentrates on what is measurable and answerable, and acceptable as a question, rather than probing less tangible, and more qualitative aspects of society" and can conceal important information about the nature of social relationships, such as reciprocity, dependence, and exploitation. Moreover, drawing distinctions between different styles of research may imply that each technique is self-contained and leads to a particular line of enquiry, whereas in reality different research approaches are analytically different aspects of social research and can complement one another.

 

 

6.05  By studying woredas in four regions, the Study captured some of the regional and subregional variations in the way decentralization is interpreted and implemented. By stratifying selected woredas (6.01), the Study was able to capture some of the diversity of economic systems in Ethiopia and to assess the extent to which this diversity was catered to by Government services. Naturally, great care is needed in generalizing the findings from 9 out of the country’s 556 woredas/special woredas.

 

6.06     Other caveats must be mentioned. First, the sheer logistical difficulty of carrying out the Study needs to be emphasized, as this of itself reveals something of the challenge faced on a daily basis by the Government. Communications with the more remote kebeles are appalling at best. During the rains many communities are inaccessible to vehicles and virtually cut off from the delivery of services. Second, the collection of research data, especially at kebele and sub-kebele levels, was inevitably affected by respondents’ perceptions of the value to them of certain kinds of information. Particularly in food deficit woredas, where food-aid needs assessments and food distribution had taken place throughout the year, communities tended to think that their answers would affect their access to relief supplies. The team tried to address this issue by making it clear that the work was broader in nature and that the choice of kebeles was unrelated to the question of relief. Nonetheless, respondents would frequently return to the issue of their food needs. Data collection was also affected by language barriers. Although the team spoke Amharic, and some participants also spoke Oromifiya, translators were often needed -- with the attendant risk of loss of accuracy. To correct for this, the team would ask key questions in a number of different ways, and guidelines were provided to team members on how to solicit qualitative information. Third, the collection of financial data and plans at different tiers of government proved immensely vexing, with many inconsistencies and gaps. As a result of this, in some locations the team was not able to collect reliable data for events more than one year past, and the Study therefore settled for analyzing information for 1998-99 only. Most clearly, this inability to gather older data means a loss of trend perspectives. Another omission from the original TOR was the decision not to pursue baseline service data from a wider sample of woredas; such data does not exist, and it is hoped that the proposed Service Delivery Surveys mentioned in para. 4.03, item iii above will help bridge this gap. A further omission was the failure to collect certain categories of information of undoubted value, because of either time constraints or the study team’s lack of expertise[16]. These deficiencies in part reflect the difficulty of field research in Ethiopia and the experimental nature of the Woreda Studies. Ways to round out certain information gaps are proposed in Chapter 9. 

 

6.07     At the community (sub-kebele) level, the main technique used was to meet with focus groups. These were of three kinds – kebele officials; community groups; and women’s groups. Kebele officials’ groups varied in size between 4 and 15, and consisted of elected kebele council members, executive committee officers, and civil servants posted to the kebele (see para. 7.03). Community groups usually consisted of a minimum of 30 residents of a kebele. These groups included men and women, and a conscious effort was made to draw in representatives of different age groups. Community groups were most often assembled with the assistance of the agricultural development agent (DA) and/or elected kebele leaders and sub-kebele representatives. Discussions with the kebele and community groups concentrated on the availability to the community of basic services and on the community’s perception of how planning and implementation take place and of the extent of their participation in these processes. In addition, the groups were asked about the avenues open to them to express dissatisfaction with services and with the participatory process itself. Women’s groups were more formally stratified to include different generations. Questions asked of them concentrated on their role, their own perception of the value of their work, the extent to which community values substantiated their views of themselves, the degree to which they were allowed voice, their representation within formal structures, their awareness of formal planning processes, and the extent of their influence in household decisionmaking. In addition, and in order to assess the cohesion of the community in identifying its needs and the extent of its participation in decisionmaking, matrix ranking exercises were sometimes used with the various groups. Groups were asked to identify the five priority needs of the community. Following discussion among themselves, they would place stones on various symbols denoting different development alternatives (for instance, a bridge or a health facility). This was followed by a discussion on why they had chosen what they had and how it related to what they had actually received. The results of the exercise were then cross-referenced against the kebele plan where one existed. In all groups, respondents were encouraged to relate their experiences freely, to provide their own definitions of their situation, and to reveal their opinions and attitudes as they saw fit. In most cases, notes were taken on how people reacted to specific questions and their willingness to participate in the research.

 

6.08     In Liben and Dubti, the two woredas with significant pastoralist populations, –officials were also asked additional research questions to assess the extent to which the different sector bureaus adapted service delivery to the pastoralists’ mobile, livestock-oriented lifestyle. In Dubti, it proved impossible to convene community or women’s focus groups: a flood in the Awash Valley had caused most of the population to move away temporarily to the Kalawan area.

 


 

7.  Decentralization and Service Delivery in the Nine Woredas

A.  The Formal Structures of Decentralized Government

 

7.01     Amhara, Southern Nations, Oromiya, and Afar Regions all share a similar four-tier governance structure, specified in the 1995 Proclamations that established their respective regional constitutions[17]. Each region has at its apex a regional council, with council members directly elected to represent each woreda. For example, the Oromiya Regional Council consists of 353 members from180 woredas. The councils have the legislative and executive authority to direct the internal affairs of the region and are complemented by an independent regional judiciary. The councils implement their mandate through an executive committee and regional sector bureaus which report to it. Thus, the Oromiya Executive Committee is chaired by the region’s president, who is directly elected, and consists of 21 members -- the 12 Zonal Administrators (appointed by the Council but drawn from the ranks of the civil service) and 9 elected Council members. The governance structures in the zones vary -- in Southern Nations, zones (and special woredas such as Konso) elect councils, which form executive committees; in Amhara and Oromiya there are no such elected councils, and zonal executive committee members are appointed by the regional council and include those from its own ranks[18]. Zonal executive committees are chaired by the zonal administrator and consist, in addition to elected representatives, of civil servants from the technical bureaus and security officials. The sector bureaus have offices at the zonal level.

 

7.02     The tripartite structure of council, executive committee, and sector bureaus is replicated at the woreda level[19]. Woreda councils consist of directly elected representatives from each kebele in the woreda. Thus, the Woreda Council in Sodo Zuria Woreda, with 40 kebeles, consists of 120 members (the number of Woreda Council representatives per kebele varied between three and five in the nine study woredas). The Woreda council has dual accountability: upward to its respective zonal and regional executive committees, and downward to its electorate. Woreda executive committees consist of around a dozen members, drawn from elected representatives and sector bureau chiefs. Woredas also feature a court, which falls under the authority of the regional judicial apparatus.

 

 The main constitutional powers and duties of the woreda council and its executive[20] are

 

(i)                  Preparing and approving the annual woreda development plans and budgets and monitoring their implementation;

(ii)                Setting certain tax rates and collecting local taxes and levies (principally land use tax, agricultural income tax, sales taxes, and user fees[21]); remitting a portion of the local tax take to the zone[22];

(iii)               Administering the fiscal resources available to the woreda (own source and transfers);

(iv)              Constructing and maintaining low-grade rural tracks, water points, and woreda-level administrative infrastructure (offices, houses);

(v)                Administering primary schools and health institutions;

(vi)              Managing agricultural development activities, and protecting natural resources.

 

7.03     The kebeles (village areas with an average population of 5,000[23]) do not enjoy the same constitutional formality as regions, zones, and woredas, but are in effect the prime contact level for most Ethiopian citizens.  Kebele administrations again consist of an elected kebele council (in principle 100 members), a kebele executive committee of 5-7 citizens, a social court[24], and the development and security staff posted in the kebele. The kebele council and Executive committee’s main responsibilities are:

 

(i)                  Preparing an annual kebele development plan;

(ii)                Ensuring the collection of land and agricultural income tax;

(iii)               Organizing local labor and in-kind contributions to development activities;

(iv)              Resolving conflicts within the community through the social courts.

 

Kebele executive committees are answerable to their woreda council. Unlike executive committee members at the region and zone, elected members receive no stipend. The only official kebele officer is the council chairman, who receives a small monthly allowance and is in some cases permitted to keep up to 10 percent of taxes collected by the kebele. Kebeles commonly form community committees – for example, water users’ committees to oversee spring management and maintenance, health brigades to drain and spray malarial areas, or special women’s committees to raise consciousness, provide education, and mobilize female labor. Below the kebele, formal structures vary. In Oromiya and Afar there are no formal sub-kebele structures; in Amhara, communities are subdivided into sub-kebeles (300-400 households), gotes (villages of about 100 households) and mengistawi buden, or government teams (30-50 households). In Southern Nations, similar sub-kebele units are termed kantas, below which are found ketenas.

 

7.04     In practice, these structures are more coherent at regional and zonal level than they are on the front lines. As the subsequent discussion will indicate, the Study found that most woreda councils met infrequently, often citing a lack of per diem, while some  councils had not met at all in 1999-2000[25]. Kebele executive committees did not tend to operate as functional bodies, reflecting in large part their unpaid and untrained nature. Most woredas and kebeles could not produce the written development plans they should have prepared for 1999-2000[26]. These factors varied to some extent by region.  The formal sub-woreda structures was more developed in Amhara, particularly insofar as the network of mengistawi buden[27] is concerned, and  least developed  in Afar, which featured little involvement in official development work by Woreda Councils and none at all by Kebele Councils. Informal and traditional structures, moreover, appear to have been under-used in favor of the uniform architecture of the modern state, although they retain significant local influence in the form of clan and extended family associations. Sector bureau representation tends to be sparse below the woreda level, with the exception of the widespread presence of agricultural development agents and primary school teachers. As will be described, a progressive attenuation of the capacity of the political and executive structures of decentralization is evident as the chain extends downwards. This compromises the Government’s ability to engage systematically with its citizens and hampers the grassroots decentralization of the development process.


B.  Planning

 

7.05     The regional constitutions empower woredas to formulate and implement their own development plans. The study found the formal planning procedures to be similar in all regions, with some significant variations. Importantly, this process only deals with capital/project planning, and not with service/recurrent planning.

 

Box 7.1:  Formal Planning Procedures in 1998-99

 

Amhara only

 

(i)                    A plan drafting committee of nine members at sub-kebele level (three elders, three women, and three youths), representing 300-400 households, identifies community needs. These needs are then aggregated at kebele level in a general community meeting. Kebele needs are further aggregated at the woreda level by the Woreda Development Committee (see below) and by the sector bureaus. In 1998-99, this process took place between November and February, at which time no indicative budget envelope was available.

 

Southern Nations and Oromiya only

 

(ii)           Each woreda sector office identifies sub-woreda needs through an examination of the service gaps in and around kebeles. The Woreda Agriculture Bureau uses the DAs at the kebele/sub-kebele levels for this, while other sector bureaus tend to do so via field visits and discussion with kebele executive committee members. In 1998-99, this took place between January and February, at which time no indicative budget envelope was available.

 

Amhara, Southern Nations and Oromiya

 

(iii)                Each woreda sector bureau prepares its own capital plan. In the absence of an indicative budget, planning is done by matching identified needs against the previous year’s budget. Sector plans are aggregated by a Woreda Development Committee consisting of elected representatives and bureau office heads.

(iv)               Before the capital plan is submitted to the Woreda Council, it is discussed with the zonal Department of Planning and Economic Development (DOPED) to check for consistency with the regional Five-Year Plan and previous performance. Recurrent planning is handled within the civil service and interpolated into the planning process at the initiative of the zonal sector bureaus and DOPEDs.

(v)                 After vetting by the zonal DOPED, consolidated (capital and recurrent) plans are submitted to the Woreda Council for approval, and then forwarded to the zone on a formal basis. In 1998-99, this took place in March – again, without an indicative budget envelope.

(vi)               After vetting by the Zonal Projects Committee (generally consisting of zonal bureau chiefs and civil servants), the Zonal Executive Committees (and Councils, where these exist) review and approve the zonal plan, comprising several woreda plans. In 1998-99, this generally took place in May, by which time the likely regional budget envelope was apparent.

(vii)         The zonal plan is reviewed and approved by the Regional Planning Bureau and Executive Committee, and subsequently by the Regional Council.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Afar

 

Planning procedures in Afar are focused at the regional level, and are initiated by the Regional Sector Bureaus. Considerable technical assistance is also provided by regional staff from neighboring Tigray and Amhara . Zones and woredas are consulted as follows:

 

(i)              A regional task force visits each zone with a set of pre-identified project proposals for the zone and its woredas. In 1998-99, this took place in January, using the previous year’s capital budget as the indicative envelope.

(ii)           The task force calls a meeting of zonal sector department heads, experts, and woreda representatives. This consultation leads to a prioritization of the proposed projects.

(iii)         The capital plan is subsequently matched against the regional budget envelope and adjusted accordingly by the Regional Executive Committee, which also interpolates the recurrent plan.

 

 

The main inter-regional differences were the requirement that communities actively participate in the initial stages in Amhara and the explicit centralization of the whole process in Afar.

 

7.06     In practice, the woredas studied used a predominantly top-down planning approach in which the inputs of communities and even of elected officials were subordinated to sector-based planning, with zonal and regional bureau staff the dominant actors. As a result, the involvement of communities and their influence on the planning of official development inputs was muted, as the study’s examination of community-level planning in 1998-99 shows.

 

7.07     In Amhara Region, as seen above, sub-kebele structures have defined planning obligations. In practice in 1998-99, however, not all kebeles constituted sub-kebele planning committees and very few managed to parlay their work into a full kebele plan; indeed, the team was only able to access informal partial kebele plans (para. 7.09); no multi-sectoral plans and no formal plans could be provided, presumably because they did not exist. Needs assessment exercises did take place in many instances, however, as is illustrated by the examples in Table 7.1.

 

7.08     The study team was keen to establish the extent to which community needs and priorities were properly identified by kebele officials and woreda bureau staff. The team therefore asked the study’s community focus groups (para. 6.07) to recall how the communities had ranked their priorities; they then compared this ranking with what the kebele had actually passed on to the woreda. They also asked women’s focus groups to rank what they saw as priorities. Three examples of these discussions are given in  Table 7.2.


Table 7.1:  Needs Identification at Kebele and Sub-kebele Levels in Southern Nations Region, 1998-99

Mackeke Rural Kebele, Konso Woreda

Gersergio Kebele, Konso Woreda

 

Urban Kebele 04, Sodo Zuria Woreda[28]

 

Direct Community Participation in Initial Needs Identification ?

 

No

Yes

No

Kebele Executive Committee identified needs with elected kanta leaders.

Informal kanta development committees[29] identified kanta needs with kanta leaders.

Elected ketena[30]  representatives identified needs with kebele executives.

 

Community Participation in Priority Setting ?

 

No

Yes

Yes

Kebele officials organized a general meeting to which all members of the community were invited, and at which kebele priorities were endorsed.

Priorities discussed and endorsed at kanta level were submitted to the Kebele Executive Committee for review, which was followed by a discussion with the community. Kebele priorities were subsequently differentiated eitheras projects to be funded through the Government budget, or as  activities to be supported by funds from different emergency food and cash programs.

 

The Kebele Executive Committee prepared a draft plan, which was discussed in an open community meeting and subsequently submitted to the Kebele Council for approval.

 

 


Table 7.2:  Ranked Development Priorities in Three Communities, 1998-99

Community focus group priorities and ranking

Women’s focus group priorities and ranking

Priorities/rankings submitted to woreda by kebele officials

1.        Health post

2.        Protected water

3.        School expansion

4.        Bridge over Woyib River

5.        Office construction for the kebele

1.        Health post

2.        Drinking water

3.        Grind mill

4.        School expansion

5.        Bridge

1.        Irrigation

2.        Health post

3.        School expansion

4.        Nursery site

5.        Office construction for the kebele

1.        Drinking water points for livestock and humans

2.        Veterinary post

3.        Drugs and staff for the health center

 

1.        Drinking water points

2.        Health center staffing

 

1.        DA housing

2.        Nursery establishment

3.        Rural road repairs

1.        Water supply scheme

2.        Maintenance of pumps

3.        Veterinary clinic

4.        More fertilizer and seed

 

1.        Health post staffing and drug supply

2.        Water supply scheme

3.        Irrigation

4.        Maintenance of pumps

1.        Contour bunding

2.        Stone wall protection of access tracks

3.        DA housing

4.        Maintenance of pumps

 

7.09     These results suggest some disconnect between what communities feel they need and what is communicated to the woreda—notably, the inclusion of administrative infrastructure and an emphasis on labor-intensive activities.  Also, the focus groups expressed community needs mainly in terms of potential capital projects, in large part because communities know what is on offer: a formal annual planning process that basically involves petitioning for new projects or facilities from a narrow, predefined menu.  When questioned about the key constraints to their well-being, community and women’s groups would generally cite household needs: a lack of employment opportunities, a lack of cash, the absence of microcredit, health problems, and drinking-water shortages; nor, on questioning, did they feel that the “government plan”  would address many of these requirements. The nature of the planning process is further illustrated by viewing a sample of the woreda and kebele plans shared with the team. These plans assume the form of tables listing capital projects, their proposed cost, and whether they were approved by the zone and subsequently the Woreda Council (see Files 1-7).

 

7.10     It was also evident that communities had very low expectations of gaining from the official planning process. The table below illustrates this. It shows projects planned in four kebeles in 1998-99 and the means used to fund them. Those projects intended for financing via the Woreda Plans are highlighted in bold, along with their fiscal 1998-99 year-end status. This table captures all of the capital projects in the public sector in each kebele, and also shows the extent to which bilateral donors, international NGOs, and the communities themselves contributed to the development process in 1998-99, a theme the study will return to. In the cases where the Government was involved in the four kebeles in Table 7.3, its contribution tended towards contract supervision and the provision of technical skills and amounted to little in the way of capital inputs.

Table 7.3:  Projects in Four Kebeles, 1998-99

Planned Project

Activity/Quantity

Financiers and Participants

Status at end of FY

Ambentu Kebele, Agarfa Woreda

Expansion of primary school

Agarfa Irrigation Project

 

Nursery project

Health post

DA’s office and house

Construction of  3 additional classrooms

Construction of 12 km of  channels

Seedling growth and distribution

Construction of health post

Construction

Community

 

Government,  community

ESRDF,  Community

ESRDF, Community

Government,

community

Implemented

 

Provisional handover stage

Implemented

Not implemented

Implemented

Kessarkio Rural Kebele, Konso Special Woreda

Road construction

 

 

 

Pond construction

Spring development

Soil conservation

Planting seedlings

DA office and house

 

Cattle crush

18 km of access road

 

 

 

2

2

Quantity unknown

1800

Construct 2

 

Construct 1

Farm Africa’s (FA) Employment Generation Scheme (EGS)

FA EGS

FA EGS

FA EGS

Community

Community

 

Community

Under construction

 

 

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

Under construction

Completed

Woibla-Selamku Rural Kebele, Farta Woreda

Credit for oxen purchase

 

Spring development

 

Credit for seed purchase

 

Upgrading primary school to 1-6

Hand-dug wells

 

Stone terracing

Drain construction

Adult literacy centers

Planned for 310 eligible family heads

Construct 10

 

1106 families requested

 

Construction

 

Construct 4

 

On 52 hectares of hillside land

0.3 km planned

Construct 3

Government via

ACSI[31]

FINNIDA and

community

Government via

ACSI

Government

 

FINNIDA and

Community

Community

Community

Community

2 family heads received

6 constructed

 

160 families received

Unfunded

 

1 completed

 

Completed

Completed

Completed

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dajet Rural Kebele, Tach Gaynt Woreda

Foot path

Spring cleaning

Hillside terracing

Fencing Dajet Primary    School

Fencing Kut Mender Clinic

Drain construction

Literacy centers

Soil and water conservation terracing

Construct 2 km

Clear 1 km of channels

100 km

Construct from local materials

 

Construct from local materials

10 km

Construct 3

Quantity unknown

Community

Community

Community

Community

 

Community

Community

Community

FHI[32], GTZ food-for-work (FFW)

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

 

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

7.11     The team also examined the fit between projects requested by woredas and projects approved by zones. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 below trace the relationship between requests from woredas in Amhara and Oromiya and what was approved by the zones in 1998-99. What is notable is that these requests, while often scaled back at the zone level due to budgetary shortages, were clearly respected in the majority of cases -- a process repeated at the regional level[33]. On the surface, the process of bottom-up planning and the top-down framing of these plans appears to harmonize at the woreda/zonal interface.  However, this is not ultimately the case. Woreda officials and bureau staff frequently and freely acknowledged that the reason for the compatibility between the woreda and zonal plans is that woreda plans are, in essence, ghost-written by the zonal technical bureaus -- on the basis of sectoral guidelines received from the region, which in turn reflect national priorities driven by the current Five-Year Plan.

 

Table 7.4: Amhara Region—Capital Projects Requested by Three Woredas, 1998-99

Project by Sector

Requested by the Woreda

Endorsed by the Zone

 

Awabel

Farta

Tach Gaynt

Awabel

Farta

Tach Gaynt

Agriculture

 

 

 

 

 

 

Development agent’s house

3

7

4

2

5

3

Development agent’s office

3

7

3

2

5

2

Veterinary post/clinic

1

2

0

1

1

0

Veterinary crush

1

1

0

1

1

0

Mule purchase

0

3

3

0

3

3

 

Seed cleaning

0

1

0

0

1

0

 

Education

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Primary village school construction

2

2

0

0

1

0

 

Primary village school furnishing

2

4

2

0

4

2

 

School upgrading

0

3

2

2

1

0

 

School expansion

0

1

1

0

0

1

 

 

 

 

 

Health

 

 

 

 

 

 

Health post construction

1

3

1

0

3

1

Purchase of generator

0

1

1

0

0

1

Health center

0

0

1

0

0

0

Water

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rural water points

14

0

1

14

0

1

 

Table 7.5: Oromiya Region—Capital Projects Requested by Three Woredas, 1998-99

Project by Sector

Requested by the Woreda     

Endorsed by the Zone

 

Agarfa

Adami Tulu

Liben

Agarfa

Adami Tulu

Liben

Agriculture

 

 

 

 

 

 

Construction of agricultural

0

0

1

0

0

0

aevelopment agent’s house

1

4

3

1

4

1

Development agent’s office

1

0

0

1

0

0

Veterinary post/clinic

1

0

2

0

0

0

Irrigation scheme

2

0

0

2

0

0

Education

 

 

 

 

 

 

Primary village school construction

0

10

3

0

3

1

School upgrading

3

10

2

3

2

1

School renovation & expansion

7

3

0

7

1

0

Health

 

 

 

 

 

 

Health post maintenance

0

2

0

0

2

0

Health post construction

3

0

2

1

0

1

Health center construction

1

2

0

1

2

0

Water

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bore hole

1

1

1

1

0

1

 

7.12     In many cases, kebeles received little or nothing of what they requested through the planning exercise. In Eniby Kebele in Awabel Woreda, for example (see Table 7.2), the community asked for the construction a new watersupply scheme, the maintenance of existing hand pumps, a new veterinary clinic, and an increase in fertilizer and seed supply. Two broken hand pumps were maintained on the 1998-99 recurrent budget of the woreda budget, but none of the other requests were realized. In Huletu Kanat Kebele in Farta Woreda, the community identified soil conservation, health post construction, completion of water schemes, and maintenance of broken hand pumps as its priority needs. None of these found their way into the 1998-99 Woreda Plan, though an office for their DA was constructed at the woreda’s initiative. In Awasso Kebele in Konso Special Woreda the community had promised labor and materials for the construction of a health post in both 1997-98 and 1998-99, but the woreda, while supportive, had been unable to commit any funds. In Awabel Woreda, in contrast, 16 kebeles identified a need for a new water scheme, 14 such schemes were included in the Woreda Plan and 13 were financed – but ETB 200,560 of the ETB 214,560 for this work came from a Swedish (SIDA) grant and the balance from community labor contributions[34].

 

7.13     With this degree of variation between community planning and what can be expected to result from it, it is not surprising that communities at times appeared indifferent to the formal planning process. The increased enthusiasm displayed in relation to the planning of activities outside the formal woreda plan suggests that apparent problems in engaging participation relate more to a lack of motivation than to capacity constraints. These nonplan activities consist mainly of projects financed through external assistance.  Three main types were encountered: ESRDF projects; (in identified food-deficit woredas, federallyfunded food- or cash-for-work schemes (FFW, CFW, the Employment Generation Scheme (EGS); and local relief and development activities financed by bilateral donors and international NGOs.

 

(i)            Planning under ESRDF follows specific protocols designed to ensure strong community input. The ESRDF Regional Office identifies and then appraises subproject proposals for ESRDF funding based on a set of criteria which include the suitability of the subproject for community management, the willingness of the community to contribute at least 10 percent of the capital costs in cash or kind, the adequacy of proposed implementation arrangements and the likelihood that the project will be properly operated and maintained. The community is kept involved and consulted at each stage, and is encouraged to take the initiative.

 

(ii)        Most FFW and EGS funds are used to finance soil and water conservation (SWC) and road building activities, In contrast to the free labor required from the community in support of many projects financed under the Woreda Plan, FFW and EGS compensate food-deficit communities and provide an invaluable source of household income in return for contributions to community capital. In food-deficit Amhara in particular, the mengistawi buden interact closely with the local agricultural DA to identify needs, plan projects, and commit labor to these SWC plans, which are subsequently prioritized at kebele level before submission to the woreda. Typically, in Dajet Peasant Association in Tach Gayint Woreda, the local agriculture DA played the pivotal role in this process, drafting the plan and submitting it to kebele executives and the woreda, then leading community discussions on the final plan. The sheer scope of these FFW/EGS-financed activities – also explored below in the discussion on budgets – is seen from the SWC plan from next-door Farta Woreda.

  

Table 7.6: Farta Woreda Soil and Water Conservation Plan, 1998-99

Activity

Plan

Actual

1. Terracing

2. Check dam

3. Check dam maintenance

4. Feeder road

5. Cut off drain

6. Artificial water way

7. Spring development

3120 hectares

6 kms.

14 kms.

14 kms.

9 kms.

8 kms.

200

3590 hectares

11.95 kms.

31.7 kms.

31.7 kms.

13.5 kms

19.8 kms.

330

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(iii)               Several of the study woredas received significant bilateral or international NGO financing -- German GTZ and Freedom from Hunger International (FHI) in Tach Gayint and Farta Woredas, Swedish SIDA in Awabel Woreda, Medicins Sans Frontieres and Action Contre La Faim in Dubti, World Vision in Sodo Zuria Woreda, and Farm Africa, Medecins Sans Frontieres,  and the Lutheran World Foundation in Konso Woreda. Planning procedures used in relation to these programs vary greatly, but usually stress participation and often embody training in planning for community members.

 

Box 7.2: Farm Africa in Konso

Farm Africa (a British INGO) supports the Southern Nations Regional Food Security Unit with a regional-level capacity building component providing hands-on technical support to the unit through a consultant placed in situ. At the woreda level, Farm Africa provides hands-on technical capacity building support to the Konso Development Association (KDA), a local NGO, with the ultimate goal of handing over Farm Africa activities to KDA in the future. At sub-woreda level, the Farm Africa program is working with communities to help build land-use planning capacity. This process includes regional and woreda-level preparatory workshops, and on-the-ground training and discussion with communities using enlarged aerial photographs of the area in question. The results from this program have been encouraging, with communities able to interpret the maps well and to use the perspective thus afforded to identify environmental issues and propose homegrown solutions, as well as to gain experience in prioritizing and planning the implementation of appropriate and sustainable EGS activities.

 

7.14     The arguments for decentralized planning stress the demand-responsiveness that can be achieved if primary beneficiaries are involved in decisions on resource allocation and project design. In Ethiopia, though, the involvement of communities in the formal annual planning process does not appear to translate into demand-responsive annual plans, nor are communities generally wellinformed about the planning process or aware of how their wishes are intermediated with national priorities and available resources. The study sample indicated that the key decisionmakers in local planning were in fact the zonal authorities[35] (except in Afar). In Amhara, the team was told, there is always substantive interaction between zonal and the woreda officials before the Woreda Council formally approves the Plan. This was generally seen as positive by woreda officials and bureau staff, since the zones have greater planning expertise and better information (on Five-Year Plan and sector targets; on available budget). In Southern Nations, the same pattern is apparent -- in the case of Sodo Zuria Woreda, the Woreda Chairman attends zonal planning meetings, but it is the Zonal Executive Committee that approves the capital budget, and thus, in effect, the annual Woreda Plan [36](there were no subsequent Woreda Council meetings to approve the plans established at zonal level). In Oromiya, the same again; here it was noted that the Zonal Project Committee (ZPC) is supposed to visit woredas annually to identify projects, but rarely does so.– More commonly it  will resort to the previous year’s plan as a basis for its work. In Oromiya, moreover, the Region plans and implements all projects above ETB 1.5 million. Afar is the outlier, with needs identification, planning, and capital budgeting all decided at regional level. The Woreda Economic Development Offices (WEDO) is responsible only for the preparation of the recurrent budget plan. Woreda officials in several locations claimed they were unable to obtain information on the criteria used for accepting or rejecting project proposals. When team members questioned local officials and community focus groups on the planning processes applicable to their individual situation, they found that understanding of them was very imperfect.

 

7.15     When this pattern is related to the role of communities in planning, it is clear that apart from articulating their needs (without much prospect of satisfaction), the major role of the community is to discuss suggestions for a capital menu, the scale of which is severely limited and the final design of which will be referenced to pre-existing sector plans. As mentioned earlier, and perhaps in response to these realities, the kebeles visited did not prepare formal plans; in fact the preferred approach, it seemed, was for kebele chairmen to request specific types of assistance from the woreda from time to time,  either verbally or in a brief letter. When asked about this, though, some officials (for example in Woibla-Selamku Kebele, Farta Woreda) indicated that this approach, useful in the past, had also not yielded much during the last two years of severe capital budget constraint (see para. 7.40).

 

7.16     The observed constraints to the kind of decentralized planning envisaged in Federal and regional constitutions can be summarized as follows:

 

·        Lack of community involvement in service delivery planning.  The project-oriented nature of the community planning cycle focuses community attention on capital projects. As will be elaborated later, capital projects most commonly account for only a small fraction of the overall woreda plan (in five of the nine study woredas, the portion of the woreda plan devoted to capital projects was 17 percent or less). Most services provided to communities are financed through the recurrent budget (salaries of civil servants, school supplies, medicines), but communities are not asked to involve themselves in service delivery planning.

                        

·        “Blue sky” budgeting. Needs identification at the community level, and many of the subsequent iterations between woreda officials and the zone, take place in the absence of a budget envelope. No indicative budget is taken into discussions with communities, which are thereby, in effect, asked to list their wishes rather than determine their priorities. The reconciliation of such wishes with the woreda budgets takes place far from the front line.

 

·        Priority given to the Five-Year Plan and to sector planning. Compounding the last point, the final choice of capital projects gives primacy to the Five-Year Plan and derived sectoral targets, with little consideration for other priorities.

 

·        Shortages of capital funds. In six of the study woredas, the capital budget allocation for 1998-99 varied between a mere US $0.16 and US $1.06 per capita[37], with the result that very few projects could be accommodated under the Woreda Plan.  In Awabel Woreda (pop. 165,000), for instance, the only projects funded through the Government budget in 1998-99 were the construction of four DA houses and offices, mainly financed by contributions of unpaid labor and hardly rating as capital formation; the construction of a veterinary post and cattle crush (again, largely using unpaid labor); and the purchase of furniture for two schools. With so few resources at hand, woreda bureau staff often expressed frustration at the elaborate process they were supposed to follow for community planning. Officials in Tach Gayint, Farta, and Sodo Zuria Woredas said they were reluctant to carry out participatory planning because they felt it raised expectations that could not be met.

 

·        Capacity constraints. Most bureaus do not post staff at community level. The value of bureau staff in helping communities plan is highlighted by the contributions of agriculture DAs, who in effect prepared most of the informal kebele plans seen by the study team. Travel from the woreda capital to communities in 1998-99 was often hindered by shortages of Government budget for per diem and fuel. Planning procedures for Amhara Region ascribe important roles to sub-woreda structures (Box 7.1), but bureau staff in both Farta and Tach Gayint Woredas told the team that the requisite sub-kebele drafting committees usually did not exist – while those that did lacked any capacity to engage in formal planning with bureau staff, needing a level of support that the bureaus were unable to provide.

 

·        Issues specific to pastoral communities. Community involvement in needs identification and planning was weakest in the two woredas with large pastoral communities (Dubti Woreda in Afar and Liben Woreda in Oromiya) – an observation made by NGO staff as well as by Government officials. In Afar and previously in Liben, the Region would take care of planning, with little consultation at the woreda level or with communities. There are many reasons for this scant communication, some related to the mobile lifestyle of pastoralists and the difficulty of delivering services to them, others to the cultural divide between the settled and the nomadic, and to highland unfamiliarity with the pastoral way of life. In Liben Woreda the team found no evidence that kebele-level needs assessment or planning now indicated had in fact taken place; requests for help were instead submitted to the Woreda on an ad hoc basis throughout the year.

 

·        Women’s involvement in planning. As described earlier, women’s needs and inputs are very poorly reflected in the community planning process. Box 7.3 elaborates.


 

Box 7.3:  Gender Issues in Community Planning and Decisionmaking

 

Women’s participation in community planning and decisionmaking was found to be almost nonexistent. Women were not equally represented with men at community discussions, especially when the gatherings were held at the community’s own initiative. Many husbands would not allow their wives to attend such meetings. Female presence at meetings organized by the woreda appeared to have been higher, as women were often “ordered” to attend. However, women claimed that they rarely expressed themselves within such fora. In a very few cases, women claimed to discuss community priorities at home with their husbands and at informal all-women gatherings. The extent to which these informal channels of expression fed into community decisionmaking, however, would depend on whether women’s priorities conflicted with those of the men.

 

Social factors militate against women’s presence and/or participation in planning and decisionmaking at the community level. These include: 

 

·         Women’s perception of themselves as disadvantaged in the realm of public speaking, due to their lack of experience and to traditional stigma attached to women expressing themselves in public. Women tended to believe they were not listened to within the community in the way that men were, irrespective of what they might say.

·         The pressure on women’s time from the multitude of tasks they are expected to handle (women in Amhara tended to fare the worst in this regard, with many claiming to get no more than three or four hours sleep each night). The range of tasks that rural women take responsibility for include water collection, coffee and meal preparation (often including grinding), milking, fodder collection, fuel wood and dung collection, land preparation and weeding, care of livestock, and childcare (obviously with variations by household and woreda according to levels of wealth and economic systems).

·         Fear of violent reprisal from their husbands if they spoke out in public fora. Many women claimed that their husbands beat them for joining public debates -- because such behavior assumed equality with men and thereby embarrassed their husbands in front of their peers. As one respondent stated, “We want to speak out, but fear prevents us.” All women in all of the study’s focus groups cited male violence as a lifestyle issue.

·         A belief among women that their primary role is within the household.

·         On occasion, the conviction that men do adequately represented their interests.

 

Women in the Study’s focus groups were generally ignorant of the annual kebele planning process and often confused it with the existence of the kebele executive committee (rather than understanding planning as an event which should directly involve the community). Those women who had heard of their kebele plan were generally unable to say what it consisted of (this, it should be added, was common for communities as a whole). The Study found no apparent correlation between the economic means of a kebele and the degree of female participation in planning and decisionmaking. For example, Eniby Kebele, Awabel Woreda is a food secure woreda with a relatively high and prolonged rate of female participation in education, where some 30 percent of women between 15 and 45 have spent some time at primary school; but its kebele focus group stood out for its lack of female participation in public meetings.

 


C.  Resource Management

 

7.17     The various regional constitutions mandate a process of resource management in which the elected woreda councils are responsible for levying and setting tax rates and collecting taxes within the regional purview; woreda budget preparation and approval, and woreda budget administration. The role of kebeles is limited to the collection of taxes and user fees and the mobilization of labor and materials. The legal structure of decentralized resource management thus identifies the woreda council as the gatekeeper of fiscal decentralization. As the study found, however, and consistent with the observations made above on planning, the real gatekeepers are the zonal and regional technical bureaus.

 

7.18     Sources of Woreda Revenues. The Federal Constitution (Articles 96-98) assigns responsibility for revenue mobilization in the manner shown in Table 7.7.  The regional constitutions of Amhara, Oromiya, and Southern Nations reflect Article 100 of the Federal Constitution, which empowers woredas to levy and collect taxes identified as sources of regional revenue[38]. In practice most tax rates have been established at the Federal level. The major exceptions to this are the fees levied on rural land use and taxes on agricultural income, which have been set through regional rural land use and agricultural income tax proclamations[39], and service user fees, which are variously established at regional, woreda, and even kebele level[40].  

 

7.19     Own Source Revenues. The amount and composition of the revenues collected by the nine study woredas in 1998-99 is shown in the tables below. Own source revenues were in no instance sufficient to cover even half of the woreda’s budgeted expenditures for 1998-99, with contributions ranging from a low of 11 percent of budget in the pastoral Liben Woreda to a high of 48 percent in the two urban woredas. Averaging across the study woredas, the equivalent of only 39 percent of recurrent expenditure and 30 percent of total expenditure in 1998-99 was financed with revenue collected by or on behalf of the woreda; the lion’s share of the budget derived from transfers from above.

Table 7.7:  Assigned Sources of Revenue and Responsibility for Collection[41]

Article 96: Sources of Revenue – Federal

Article 97:  Sources of Revenue - Region

Article 98: Sources of Revenue - Shared

 

1.        Customs duties, taxes, and other payments levied on  imports and exports.

2.        Taxes on the incomes of Federal Government employees and Ethiopian employees of international organizations.

3.        Taxes on Federal Government enterprises.

4.        Tax on the proceeds of national lotteries and related ventures.

5.        Taxes on the proceeds of road, air, rail, water, and sea transport services.

6.        Rental incomes from Federal Government houses and properties.

7.        Federal license fees.

8.        Income from federal monopolies.

9.        GOE stamp duties.

 

 

1.        Tax on incomes of Regional and private sector employees.

2.        Fees for usufructory land rights.

3.        Taxes on the incomes of private and incorporated farmers.

4.        Taxes on the profits of resident merchants.

5.        Sales tax.

6.        Water transport fees within the Region.

7.        Rental incomes from state government houses and properties.

8.        Taxes on regional government enterprises.

9.        Taxes on small-scale mining operations.

10.     Regional license fees.

11.     Royalties on the use of forest resources.

 

 

 

1.        Taxes on jointlyowned enterprises.

2.        Taxes on corporation profits and shareholder dividends.

3.        Taxes on large-scale mining, petroleum, and gas operations.

 

 

Table 7.8:  Revenues as a Proportion of Expenditures in Nine Woredas, 1998-99

 

Woreda

Own Source Revenue --

Actual  (ETB million)

Total Plan Expenditure -- Actual

(ETB million)

Own-Source Revenue as a Proportion  of  (%)

Recurrent

Capital

Total

Recurrent Expenditure

Total Expenditure

Awabel

1.56

3.10

0.74

3.84

50

41

Tach Gayint

0.67

2.31

2.00

4.31

29

15

Agarfa

0.79

3.13

1.10

4.23

25

19

Konso

1.95

3.91

0.85

4.76

50

41

Farta

1.69

4.30

2.25

6.75

43

25

Sodo Zuria

3.86

7.78

0.26

8.04

50

48

Adami Tulu

2.15

3.61

0.84

4.45

59

48

Liben

0.59

4.83

0.68

5.51

12

11

Dubti

0.55

1.60

0.83

2.43

34

23

 

7.20     No major region-wise variations in own source revenue patterns were observed, nor do regional revenue policies differ significantly, though some tentative correlations with woredas’ economic systems can be observed. As seen in Tables 7.9 and 7.10, per capita own source revenue was universally low, ranging between US$0.64 and US$2.23 for the year. In all cases, direct taxation provided over half of total revenue, with the taxes on the incomes of Government employees stationed in the woreda consistently important. In woredas lacking a significant urban center, taxes on agricultural incomes and land use fees accounted for a major portion of revenue (as would be expected, they are of less account where the woreda includes a town providing significant sales tax revenue, and in pastoral areas[42]). Nontax revenue was proportionally higher in the woredas with a large town, reflecting incomes that could be tapped through user charges, as well as in Liben Woreda, primarily from cost recovery on livestock services supplied by the Southern Rangelands Development Unit[43]. The particularly low levels of nontax revenue in Agarfa and Dubti stemmed from different factors: in Agarfa, from poverty reflected in low user-fee collection, in Dubti, from the very scant interaction between the pastoralist communities in Afar and officialdom. Indirect taxation contributed little, except in Sodo Zuria, reflecting sales tax receipts from Ziway town and the main Addis – Moyale road that runs through the woreda, and in Dubti (sales tax on the salt trade)[44].  As would be expected, the predominant sources of revenue for the woredas with major urban concentrations were personal and business income taxes, and for the more rural woredas, agricultural income tax and land use fees. As a corollary to this in an economy so dependent on rainfall, urban woredas generate a fairly steady stream of tax income, while rural woredas experience wider year-to-year fluctuations.

Table 7.9:  Composition of Woreda Own Revenues, 1998-99

Woreda

Rural

w. Urban Center

Pastoral

Awabel

Tach Gayint

Agarfa

Konso

Farta

Sodo Zuria

Adami Tulu

Liben

Dubti

Total own revenue (OR,  ETB million.)

1.56

0.67

0.79

1.95

1.69

3.86

2.15

0.59

0.55

Per capita OR (ETB)

10.30

7.20

11.10

11.10

7.00

17.20

17.80

5.10

7.30

% of OR from direct taxes

75.90

86.10

82.00

72.90

86.20

53.20

57.40

61.20

60.60

% of OR from indirect taxes

2.80

0.90

7.20

3.30

0.90

21.80

8.00

4.20

33.30

% of OR from nontax rev.

21.30

13.0

10.90

23.90

12.90

25.10

34.60

34.60

6.30

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 7.10:  Main Sources of Own Revenues by Percentage, Seven Woredas, 1998-99

 

 

Woreda

Rural

w. Urban Center

Pastoral

 

Tach Gayint

 

Agarfa

 

Farta

 

Sodo Zuria

 

Adami Tulu

 

Liben

 

Dubti

 

Direct 

 

Personal income     tax

 

21.1

 

27.4

 

17.1

 

23.3

 

28.0

 

51.6

 

20.8

 

Ag income tax

29.8

22.3

34.7

8.4

6.4

3.3

20.3

 

Land use fees

33.9

27.3

32.5

5.7

10.1

3.7

-

 

Business income tax

1.3

4.9

-

16.4

11.0

2.6

19.4

Indirect

Sales tax

0.7

7.0

0.8

20.1

5.6

4.1

33.1

Nontax

Fees for service (inc. court fines and registration fees)

 

13.0

6.3

12.3

25.0

32.0

27.7

6.2

Total percentage

84.5

95.2

97.4

98.9

93.1

93.0

99.8

 

 

7.21     The Federal Government’s emerging tax reform agenda, supported by the IMF’s Poverty Reduction Grant Facility (FY01) and the Bank’s Emergency Recovery Support Credit (FY01), is likely to impact on the relative distribution of taxes in two important ways. First, as Federal public enterprises are privatized, the revenue now accruing to the Federal Government from employee income taxes will shift to the regions and woredas. Second, if the current sales tax regime is replaced by a comprehensive VAT system, and if this is shared on the basis of origin, the distribution of the tax yield will shift significantly in favor of the regions and woredas. This would substantiate existing data and analysis[45]/ which point to the need for strengthening the resource base at the woreda level. Given what is currently a very limited potential for raising additional revenue from direct taxation, much of any resource increase will have to come from indirect taxes, and from an expansion of the tax base (i.e., more efficient collection) rather than from raising rates. This has major implications for local revenue management capabilities, the efficiency of which the study did not assess, but which the Regionalization Report rated as needing substantial improvement. Woreda revenue management performance, its future potential, and the means to achieve this will be investigated later this year in a Regional Revenue Review. This exercise will be jointly managed by the Federal and regional governments and the Bank and Fund, and financed from the proceeds of an Italian Capacity Building Trust Fund. In addition to its diagnostic thrust, the Review will provide training for regional revenue staff (see also Chapter 9).

 

7.22     The Federal Subsidy. The logic of fiscal decentralization would suggest that the smaller the unit of government, the more accurately can levels of taxation and allocation of public expenditures match people’s choices and needs. Consistent with this, each unit of government would seek to balance own resources with expenditures, thereby both preserving fiscal autonomy and promoting accountability to tax-paying constituents. In practice, however, federations are generally characterized by both vertical imbalances (para. 3.05-06; the differences between central and regional revenue capacity and expenditure requirements), and horizontal imbalances (the same difference across regions). Differential resource transfers from higher to lower levels of government are used as a mechanism to neutralize these imbalances and to promote equity across the state. In Ethiopia, both vertical and horizontal imbalances are especially pronounced. Typically, the Ethiopian Federal Government will collect over 80 percent of all revenue, while its share of expenditure is just over 50 percent. Conversely, subnational entities, which collect only some 20 percent of revenues, account for roughly 50 percent of total expenditure[46]. In the interests of equity and political stability, a major transfer of federal resources to the regions takes place through the Federal budget. Transfers are made on the basis of a formula approved at the Federal level[47]. The formula, revised last fiscal year, takes into consideration population size (55 percent of the weight); a composite development index, inverted to account for regional deprivation (20 percent);  an index of revenue effort (15 percent); and a poverty index (10 percent). In 1998-99, this transfer formula allotted 27.96 percent of the Federal transfer to Oromiya, 21.39 to Amhara, 17.97 to Southern Nations, and 5.46 to Afar. Ideally, in order to fine-tune the subsidy, the same or a similar formula should be used to transfer resources from region to zone to woreda.

 

7.23     The regions in practice distribute these subsidies between zones in a variety of ways, some using formulae that partially mimic the federal transfer, others not[48]. However, transfer distribution from zones to woredas in the nine woredas under study was always discretionary and followed no objective formula. Discussions with many officials involved in this process revealed that the common factors determining the amount transferred by the zone were ongoing expenditure commitments, the woreda’s record of project implementation[49], and the quantity of extrabudgetary financing likely to be available to the woreda from sources outside the purview of the Woreda Plan. This discretion is evidenced in Table 7.11, which looks at the proportion of the zonal transfer received in each woreda and compares this with the woreda’s share of zonal population.

 

 

 

 

Table 7.11:  Percentage Shares of Population and Transfers, 1998-99

Zone

Woreda

Population

Share of zonal population in the woreda (%)

Share of zonal transfer provided to the woreda (%)

Per capita transfer

(ETB)

East Gojam

South Gonder

 

Borena

Bale

East Shewa

North Omo

Konso SW

Afar 1

Awabel

 165,312

   9.7

    2.9

13.0

Farta

 241,101

 12.6

    7.9

19.5

Tach Gaynt

   95,666

   5.0

    6.4

39.8

Liben

 117,700

   7.7

  15.6

  8.9

Agarfa

   71,608

   5.5

    2.9

47.4

Adami Tulu

 120,695

   6.7

    7.0

20.4

Sodo Zuria

 224,688

   7.5

    4.4

38.2

Konso

 176,274

   1.2

    0.9 [50]

28.4

Dubti

   75,674

 20.6                  

10.8

41.4

 

7.24     Discretion based on ongoing commitments, performance factors, and access to external resources is a common enough resource allocation tool. In this particular context, though, discretion in a system in which there is limited consultation with beneficiaries can cause resentment. Discussions at village and even woreda level indicated that there was almost no understanding among citizens of how woreda budgets are mediated, and virtually no awareness at all that transfer formulae exist. Nonetheless, complaints that neighboring woredas had been favored, and speculation about why this should be (ethnic preferences, political influence) were common, and occasionally rancorous. The serious ethnic conflicts that broke out in Sodo Zuria and more generally in North Omo Zone in late 1999 and early 2000 were in part fuelled by perceptions that certain groups had received preferential treatment from the Government. Woreda officials in Sodo Zuria told the team they would strongly prefer a transparent formula for transfers from the zone; in their opinion the coexistence of many ethnic groups provided fertile ground for suspicion about why some woredas would “receive more projects” than others. They also claimed that ethnicity alliances between zonal and woreda officials could lead to resource misallocations under a nontransparent formula. That said, Table 7.11 and Figure 1 show that in 1998-99the food-insecure woredas in the study (Tach Gayint, Liben, Adami Tulu and Konso) did, with the exception of Konso (but see below), receive from the zone per capita transfers greater than their share of zonal population, while the reverse is true for the food-secure woredas (Awabel, Farta, Agarfa, Sodo Zuria and Dubti).

 

 

 

 


 


Figure 7.1: Woreda Shares of Zonal Population and Zonal Transfers, 1998-99

 

7.25     Another factor bearing on the downward flow of federal transfers[51] through the vertical hierarchy is that regions and zones retain a significant portion of it to cover their own administrative expenses, and to provide for the maintenance of facilities/assets at all levels and for the development of new capital works at the regional, zonal, or inter-woreda levels. Obviously not all of the federal transfer can be passed down to the woredas. Table 7.12 below, however, shows that the shrinkage is considerable. The percapita transfer to the regions was almost uniform in 1998-99, ranging between ETB 47.3 and ETB 54.8. Transfers from region to zone are formula-based in Amhara and Southern Nations, and the shaded area of Table 7.12 shows where discretion is exercised in the distribution of the transfer. For Amhara and Oromiya, it is clear that in 1998-99 discretion gave rise to considerable variations in the proportion of the overall transfer allocated by the region to the zone in Oromiya, and by the zones to the woredas in both regions (see para. 7.24 for a partial explanation). A key component of this shrinkage may be highlighted by looking at the recurrent portion of the transfer[52]. In the seven conventional woredas in the study (minus Konso and Dubti), the proportion of the recurrent transfer retained at higher levels varied between 57-74 percent. Since the regions reported that 85-90 percent of the recurrent portion of the transfer was used for salaries, this suggests that a half to two-thirds of each region’s recurrent transfer was used to pay government staff posted above the woreda level, and in practice far from the front line. Afar and Oromiya, which do not use transfer formulae at the zonal level, retained more of the recurrent budget at regional level (84 and 37 percent respectively) than Amhara and Southern Nations (29 and 26 percent). This perhaps reflects the heavier regional input in program planning and implementation in these two regions, but also suggests a temptation to hoard funds passing down the hierarchy unless obliged to send them on.

 

Table 7.12:  Vertical Transmission of Transfers, 1998-99

Region

Zone

Woreda

Per capita transfer (ETB)

% of recurrent transfer

retained by

Region

Zone

Woreda

Region

Zone

Amhara

East Gojam

Awabel

 

 

47.3

 

            43.9

13.0

29.3

32.0

South Gonder

Farta

31.2

19.5

29.3

45.0

 

Tach  Gaynt

39.8

29.3

Oromiya

Borena

Liben

 

 

54.7

 

19.3

38.9

37.3

32.0

Bale

Agarfa

41.7

47.4

37.3

25.0

East Shewa

Adami Tulu

19.5

20.43

37.3

23.0

Southern

Nations

North Omo

Sodo Zuria

 

53.3

 

34.0

38.2

25.9

31.4

Konso SW

Konso

Not applicable:

treated like a zone

21.8

25.9

Not applicable

Afar

Zone 1

Dubti

54.8

No transfer – goes direct to woredas

41.4

84.0

Not applicable

 

7.26     Off-plan Resources–ESRDF, bilaterals, international NGOs, emergency eelief. An important consideration which applied when a zone determined the capital subsidy for each woreda was whether it was likely to receive extrabudgetary development assistance from ESRDF, bilateral or INGO area-based schemes[53], and/or from the food- or cash-for-work programs administered by the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Bureau (DPPC) and various line ministries[54]. If a woreda did receive one or more of these types of assistance, this could lead to reductions in the formal capital budget.

 

(i)                  ESRDF resources are aimed at the poor but are not clearly targeted to poor woredas. As ESRDF ostensibly follows a demand-driven approach in which subproject proposals are received directly from communities or their intermediaries, ESRDF subprojects do not appear in the formal capital budget. However, they do influence the allocation of the capital budget, particularly for health facilities and schools; and since ESRDF finances subprojects only after the approval of the regional government, ESRDF resources are fairly systematically offset during capital budget preparation. 

 

(ii)                Both chronic and emergency food- and cash-for-work assistance is planned outside the woreda budget and transferred from the federal level. This assistance is often allocated during the course of the budget year, depending upon such factors as rain failure and the pipeline of food aid. The study found that the flow of such assistance almost always resulted in an offset against the formal capital budget, although this was not in conformity with federal policy[55]. The implications of this are discussed in para. 7.36 below.

 

(iii)               Precise information on bilateral and NGO resource flows in 1998-99 was hard to collect, not least because neither zonal/woreda staff nor local NGO staff had a clear idea of them, and also because they were not reported to local bureaucracies in a way that could be factored into the budget envelope. These did appear to be offset at times, but not consistently. See also Annex 3.

 

7.27     The presence of an INGO or bilateral and/or a tradition of food aid could have a significant impact on the overall resource envelope available for development, and this clearly influenced the size of the formal capital transfer that zones chose to allocate. This was universally acknowledged by zonal planners and woreda council members. In Southern Nations, for example, both Sodo Zuria and Konso Special Woreda benefit from significant INGO assistance. Sodo Zuria in 1998-99 received some ETB 2.2 million from World Vision inputs, and this was said by South Omo zonal officials to be the main factor explaining the difference between the capital transfers to Sodo Zuria and neighboring Chencha Woreda, which did not receive any INGO funding (ETB 1.28 and 9.29 per capita respectively; if World Vision inputs are counted against the capital budget for Sodo Zuria, it would increase to ETB 12.1 per capita). In Konso, an extremely poor and food-insecure woreda, the official percapita capital transfer was only ETB 4.8 in 1998-99; when Farm Africa contributions are added to the capital budget, the figure increases to over ETB 80 per capita. In Oromiya, at first sight it appears strange that the 1998-99 per capita capital subsidy was much higher for food-secure Agarfa Woreda[56] (ETB 15.4) than for food-insecure Adami Tulu Woreda (ETB 4.6) – but Regional officials explained that Adami Tulu received considerable donor and food aid[57] in 1998-99, while Agarfa received virtually none[58].

 

7.28     Most INGO, bilateral, and food aid resources are not accurately accounted for by zonal planners, and their influence on the allocation of transfers is thus, inevitably, haphazard. By the same token, they are not considered in the course of the formal capital planning process, though in practice both bilateral/INGO and food aid inputs are often planned with considerable beneficiary involvement, and provide a greater motivation to communities to engage than the formal plan (para 7.13). A contrasting and exceptional example from Awabel Woreda, and one which will be referred to again in Chapter 8, is offered by the Swedish SIDA-financed woreda grant scheme. Under the scheme, an untied block grant is given to certain pilot woredas in East Gojam Zone, and is accounted formally through the woreda budget (and thus legitimately offsets an equivalent amount that would otherwise have been provided by the zone[59]). There are several advantages to this approach. One is predictability; Awabel Woreda knows it will receive ETB 450,000 (61 percent of its 1998-99 capital budget) from this source each year for five years. More importantly, the woreda itself can select the projects it wishes to implement, as opposed to receiving funds that are in effect pre-earmarked at the zonal level. Officials in Awabel also praised the flexible and simple approach embodied in the SIDA instrument: it allows schemes to be started on a pilot basis and replicated as and when experience counsels, while the procedures associated with grant administration are straightforward and allow much quicker implementation than the official capital transfer does.

 

 

 

Box 7.4  The SIDA Block Grant Program in Awabel Woreda

 

Participation in planning is assured through active stakeholder workshops. In Awabel Woreda in 1998-99, a total of 11,050 people participated in the planning workshops.

 

Planning process starts at gote (sub-kebele) level and proceeds to the kebeles and thence to the woreda. At gote level a plan formulation committee is established, and a workshop is held with the assistance of the Development Agent and other woreda officials and staff (who have received training in participatory development and gender planning). The gote workshops have two outputs. The first is a list of problems, with causes and solutions. The second is a work program which specifies the contribution of the community. Meetings are then held at kebele level. The requests from the gotes are reviewed and prioritized by the kebele development committees; the prioritized demands are submitted to the Woreda Development Committee through the kebele executives; and the Woreda Development Committee prioritizes them.

 

Implementation and follow up of any project is the responsibility of the Woreda Development Committee. The Committee places tenders, enters into contracts, and follows up on implementation. The Committee is eligible to tender for the full amount of a contract and is not bound by the normal ceiling of ETB 50,000. Kebele administrations are responsible for coordinating the contributions from the community via the mengistawi buden.  The Woreda receives an annual fixed sum of ETB 450,000 from the Region for capital expenditure and about ETB190,000 for capacity building, and is free to allocate it to programs of its choosing. The distribution of capital projects clearly reflects local priorities, as documented through the planning process. Most funds have gone towards road constriction and drinking water schemes. Funds are disbursed quarterly to the account of the Woreda Council, against an annual plan and quarterly reports.

 

Implementation of the program has been good and timely, not least because of the major contribution of local labor that the SIDA grants have evoked. In 1997-98, for example, 12 of 13 planned handwells were dug and all 500 km. of planned terracing was completed. In 1998-99, the community contributed ETB 118,900, and in 1999, ETB 444,600 – almost equal to the SIDA contribution.

 

Source: Tegegne Gebre Egziabher, June 2001 (Annex 3)

 

7.29     In-Kind Contributions. In Amhara Region in particular, unremunerated community contributions of labor and materials (and sometimes cash) were major sources of development finance for the woredas in 1998-99 and were applied to the maintenance of existing assets and the development of new infrastructure (rural roads, terraces, drains, nurseries, schools, health facilities, and official houses and offices). The community did contribute in the other study regions, but not to the same extent -- the practice is deeperrooted in Amhara through the mengistawi buden networks. It was not possible for the study team to assess all such community inputs, as official records of labor quantities used are not retained systematically. A conservative reading of the evidence, however, suggests that the value of community contributions certainly exceeded official capital transfers to the woredas in Amhara[60]. In Awabel Woreda, which received a capital subsidy of ETB 0.74 million in 1998-99, communities contributed labor and materials to the value of at least ETB 0.67 million for agro-forestry and SWC activities, in addition to another ETB 0.15 million for roads, water schemes, and housing – a total of ETB 0.82 million. The picture in Tach Gayint Woreda is consistent with this. The woreda received an official capital budget of ETB 2.0 million; communities contributed at least ETB 1.31 million on schemes costed by the team, and much more besides (the ETB 1.31 million consisted of labor and materials for SWC activities in only three of the woreda’s 16 kebeles, and for the construction of 3 DA offices and 2 DA houses)[61].

 

7.30     Budgeting in the Nine Woredas. Capital and recurrent budgeting are handled separately in Ethiopia[62], and this is reflected in regional procedures. As described earlier, the formal planning process involving woreda and kebele residents bears only upon the capital budget[63]. Woreda own-source revenues do cover a significant portion of woreda capital budgets, as Table 7.13 below indicates. These revenues, however, are applied towards the recurrent budget—the use of which is largely determined by zonal officials. In other words, the capital/recurrent disconnect and its administrative protocols act to disempower woreda inhabitants. The bifurcation of the budget system has other important implications for woredas as well:

 

(i)                  There is virtually no scope in the planning process for communities to choose between capital projects and recurrent outlays;

 

(ii)                Woreda inhabitants exercise no budgetary control over the services they are provided with, nor over the staff who are posted in their communities to deliver them.

 

These factors materially impact on the potential for communities and their representatives to influence the development process at the grassroots level.  

 

 

 

 
Table 7.13:  Per Capita Revenue and Expenditure Patterns for Nine Woredas, 1998-99

 

Zone

 

Woreda

Resources (ETB)

Expenditures (ETB)

Own revenues as a % of recurrent expenditure

Own revenues as a % of capital expenditure

Capital budget as a % of total budget

Own revenues

Transfer

 

 

Total

Rec.

Cap.

Total

 

E. Gojam

Awabel

10.3

13.0

 

23.3

18.8

3.6

22.4

 

55

 

290

16

South

Gonder

Farta

7.0

19.5

26.5

17.6

8.7

26.3

40

80

33

T. Gaynt

7.2

39.8

47.0

24.3

21.0

45.3

30

34

46

Borena

Liben

5.1

8.93

44.0

41.0

5.8

46.8

12

88

12

Bale

Agarfa

11.1

47.4

58.5

43.7

15.2

58.9

25

73

26

E. Shewa

A. Tulu

17.8

20.4

38.2

33.71

4.7

38.4

53

380

12

N. Omo

S. Zuria

17.2

38.2

55.4

40.9

1.3

42.2

42

1320

3

KSW

Konso

11.1

 

28.4

 

 

39.4

 

22.7

4.8

27.5

49

230

17

Zone-1

Dubti

7.3

41.4

 

48.7

 

10.9

22.3

33.2

22

33

67

 

7.31     Budget Formulation. The preparation of formal recurrent and capital budgets for submission to higher levels of government typically starts at woreda level in February of each year, although there are regional variations. The Box below is based on what the team was told by woreda and zonal civil servants; a significant common feature is the virtual absence of community participation[64]. As can be seen, the matching of resources with plans and priorities from below is mainly done at the zonal level. Afar Region provides the major exception to this, with budgeting managed mostly at the regional level. The role of the woredas in budgeting is generally quite reactive: woreda budgeting is largely a recording of decisions made at higher levels of the bureaucracy.

 

 

Box 7.4  Budget Formulation in Amhara, Southern Nations, and Oromiya Regions in 1998-99

 

In Amhara and Southern Nations, each sector bureau of the woreda prepared a combined recurrent and capital plan and budget. While the capital portion of the plan and budget took account of community needs, the recurrent portion was formulated under the direction of the zonal sector departments. This took place in February, at which time there was no budget envelope available. Budgeting was therefore based on the previous year’s allocations. These sector plans and budgets were subsequently submitted to the Woreda Finance Office. Prioritization typically occurred in the following order: nondiscretionary recurrent expenditure, operation and maintenance, ongoing capital works, followed lastly by new capital projects[65]. Thus some tradeoff between capital and recurrent alternatives was made at the woreda level, but essentially within the bureaucracy. Woreda civil servants indicated that the main trades were between O&M and new capital projects, with the former squeezed to stretch the funds available for the latter.

 

The draft sector plans and budgets were then aggregated at woreda level by the Woreda Projects Committee (WPC), which consists of woreda bureau chiefs and elected officials. At this stage, in March-April, there was still no budget envelope available.  The plans and budgets were informally discussed with the zonal Department of Planning and Economic Development (DOPED) to ensure that higher-level priorities were factored in and were then submitted to the Woreda Council.

 

In Oromiya the recurrent budgeting process is more centralized. WPCs do not consider recurrent budgets at all, and thus there is no possible scope for trading capital and recurrent interests at the woreda level. Recurrent inputs are added by the zonal DOPEDs to the plans to be submitted to the woreda councils.

 

After approval from the woreda council, the plans and budgets were formally submitted to the zone. This generally took place in April-May. At the zone, DOPED submitted the draft plans and budgets to the Zonal Projects Committee (ZPC, generally consisting of zonal bureau chiefs and civil servants), which consolidated them; at this stage, in May, an indicative forward-looking budget envelope had been provided by the Region.

 

The ZPC then submitted the consolidated plan and budget to the zonal executive committee (the Zonal Council in Southern Nations) for approval. The zonal plans and budgets were then submitted it to the regional planning bureau, and subsequently to the regional executive committee and regional council.

 

The regional budget proclamations and associated authority to commit funds were gazetted in September 1998, three months into the fiscal year.

 

7.32     If woredas are to exercise their constitutional right to oversee their own economic development, one would assume they would prefer more autonomy over the budget formulation process. Interestingly, most elected woreda officials did not think zonal interventions eroded their authority. Woreda council representatives commonly felt their administration lacked the skills to formulate proper budgets (as discussed below, most woredas have had trouble filling higher-end vacancies, particularly in the woreda finance offices). Some also pointed out that the zone did not undermine autonomy anyway, since projects and spending have to be in line with the Five-Year Plan[66]. Woreda civil servants were also supportive of the budgeting role played by the zone, and explained it as a means to ensure that expenditure is correctly prioritized (by providing fully for recurrent expenditures before capital works, and for ongoing projects before new ones). Woreda officials and civil servants alike were much more concerned with the level of resources than with the allocative process – the sheer shortage of funding was seen as a much more urgent concern.

 

7.33     Budget composition. As shown in Table 7.14, the bulk of the total woreda budget is usually preempted by civil service salaries; even more so the recurrent budget. Figure 2 and Table 7.14 also show, unsurprisingly, that wage expenditures dwarf critical nonwage recurrent items – operating commodities and supplies, staff per diems, maintenance. International service standards suggest that a staff-intensive, field-oriented basic service in a LDC will normally need to allocate between 20-30 cents of each recurrent budget dollar to nonwage recurrent expenditure if it is to remain mobile and effective. By this standard, the study woredas do not appear to have made adequate proportional allocations, and a closer inspection of the woreda sector budgets shows that vital shortages existed in most sectors and in most woredas, as will be described in

 

Table 7.14:  Share of Salaries in Nine Woreda Budgets, 1998-99

Region

Zone

Woreda

Salaries as a % of

Total budget

Rec. budget

Amhara

E. Gojam

Awabel

67

89

S. Gonder

Farta

60

90

T. Gaynt

45

94

Oromiya

Borena

Liben

73

88

Bale

Agarfa

66

90

E. Shewa

A. Tulu

72

85

Southern Nations

N. Omo

S. Zuria

90

94

Konso

Konso

71

86

    Afar

Zone 1

Dubti

28

84

 

Section D below. Sectorwise, between 80-90 percent of the recurrent budget in six of the nine sample woredas was allocated to education, health and agriculture, with education receiving a majority of recurrent funds in all woredas except Dubti in Afar. Put another way, the dominant development expenditure in the study woredas was the salaries of primary teachers. As argued in the Tikur Inchini study on the interplay of hierarchy and participation in the education sector in one particular woreda (Annex 4), this uniformity exemplifies the way in which the budget process in Ethiopia is used to pursue key national policies.

 

Table 7.15:  Sectoral Composition of Recurrent Expenditures, 1998-99

Region

Zone

Woreda

Proportional Share (%)

Agric

Educ

Health

 

Admin

 

Finance

Justice

Prosecutor

Co-Ops

Amhara

East Gojam

Awabel

26.8

52.5

4.4

8.7

3.6

1.6

1.5

1.0

South Gonder

Farta

19.4

57.0

11.5

6.0

3.4

0.5

1.3

0.9

Tach Gaynt

20.6

55.5

7.9

7.7

4.2

1.3

1.6

1.2

Oromiya

 

Liben

11.8

57.7

23.0

3.9

1.7

0.4

1.0

0.6

Agarfa

13.8

69.0

3.8

6.8

4.0

0.6

1.1

0.9

Adami Tulu

27.0

51.1

9.6

6.0

4.1

0.5

1.0

0.8

Southern Nations

North Omo

Sodo Zuria

13.8

68.5

4.9

2.8

2.6

3.1

4.3

0.0

KSW

Konso

16.3

52.0

10.4

5.4

10.4

1.4

2.7

1.4

Afar

 

Zone 1

Dubti

38.2

42.6

10.7

7.5

1.0

0.0

 

7.34     Budget management. The woreda capital budgets described in Table 7.13 above show allocations to the woredas, not the funds actually managed by them. In Amhara, woreda technical bureaus played a larger role in project implementation than in the other regions, particularly in those woredas (including Awabel) that received a SIDA block grant. In Oromiya and Southern Nations there were no significant actual transfers of capital resources from the zones to woredas (with the exception of the Special Woredas in Southern Nations); most projects were directly implemented by the regional and zonal sector bureaus. In Afar, the region retained all of the capital budget. All parties explained this as necessary given limited project/contract management capacity at the woreda level.

 

7.35     The annual regional budget proclamations define the powers of the various tiers of the administration (and their finance offices) in budget administration. The 1998-99 Amhara Budget Proclamation devolves a certain degree of discretion in funds transfer to the woredas, which are permitted to reallocate (i) recurrent budget from one program”[67] to another within the same head, and between salary and operating costs within the same “program”; (ii) capital budget appropriations from one item of expenditure to another within the same sub-program. Woredas in Oromiya and Southern Nations do not have the same degree of discretion, other than Special Woredas in Southern Nations, which are accorded a degree of reallocative freedom consistent with the role of the zone (though not between capital and recurrent budgets, and not generally for donor-financed projects). In practice, it appeared, woredas would always consult with their zone before making such reallocations, while the need to fully finance salaries precluded much flexibility within the recurrent budget.

 

7.36     According to woreda finance officials, budgeted funds usually flowed to the woredas as planned and with few delays once the original appropriations were made in September. The team encountered some instances of delays in salary transfers (for example in Konso and in Sodo Zuria Woredas, and in Tikur Inchini), and a few cases in which nonsalary operating expenses were not paid as budgeted[68]; generally, though, the timeliness of payments from the zones to the woredas could be rated as quite acceptable. This is an unusual and creditable result for an LDC which faces the kinds of logistic and personnel difficulties that Ethiopia does, and speaks to the high degree of discipline manifest in the civil bureaucracy. That said, it should be noted that the phenomenon is not universal, and that delays in funding flows are a common cause of frustration in donor-financed projects. These arise very often because of the plethora of donor procedural requirements and the burden they impose on the small stock of decision-makers empowered to deal with them at the Federal or regional levels[69].

 

7.37     Budget accountability. Upward budget accountability was well-established in all of the study woredas. All woreda accounts were closed up to the current year, and four of the nine woredas’ 1998-99 consolidated accounts had been audited at the regional level.  Transmission of monthly financial reports from the woreda to the zone, and thence to the region, is standard practice -- albeit honored in the breach in two of the woredas (Konso and Dubti, which were renowned for inefficiency in this area). While the team did not focus on issues of corruption (this will be done under the Service Delivery Surveys mentioned in para. 4.06 (iii) above), these appeared to be fairly rare. Significant leakages were only reported in two recent audits in the study woredas. Most serious was the misappropriation of approximately ETB 1 million in Konso in 1998-99. Six individuals from the Woreda Finance Bureau associated with the misuse of funds have since been removed from post and legally charged. The 1988-99  audit of the Sodo Zuria woreda accounts also identifies a leakage of ETB 34,000. Once again, these results are unusual in a LDC context and speak highly of the discipline inherent in the Ethiopian civil service.

 

7.38     By contrast, downward budget accountability is slight. Although the consolidated woreda accounts are presented annually to the Woreda Councils, discussion of them was said to be cursory, while their dissemination does not go beyond this. The team could find no evidence of kebele-level gatherings to discuss the composition or the delivery of the woreda budget; ordinary members of the public had little apparent awareness of how the overall FY1998-99 budget was composed and had been spent. While generally aware of the capital projects planned for their particular kebele, community focus group members did not usually know their value. Nor, as will be discussed in Section D below, did they perceive they had a role to play in monitoring their delivery.

 

7.39     Issues in revenue generation and budget management as they impact on decentralization could be summarized as follows:

 

·        Partial budgeting. In essence, the representative structures at the woreda level and below are only invited to deal with a small portion of the total budget. In the case of Awabel Woreda in 1998-99, for instance, the capital budget allocated to the woreda amounted to only 15 percent of the resources made available for development through formal channels[70]. If nonplan resources are added to this (bilateral/INGO resources, FFW/CFW/EGS, ESRDF), this figure diminishes further – to 6-7 percent in the case of Konso Woreda, for example.

 

·        Limited local revenue generation and the disconnect in its application. Woreda own-source revenues are currently inadequate to cover the woreda’s development requirements, necessitating transfers from above. This implies a diminution of control over total revenue available to a woreda; in Ethiopia, however, those revenues which are generated locally are applied to the recurrent component of the woreda budget, over which the woreda has no effective control at all. The capital component of the budget, which ostensibly falls under the woreda’s jurisdiction, is in fact transferred from outside. This severance of the link between revenues contributed and their management further diminishes the woreda’s influence over its own development process.

 

·        Capacity constraints. The shortage of budgeting and accounting skills in the civil service, and their virtual absence among elected officials, acted as a severe constraint to effective budget formulation or management at the woreda level, as well as to meaningful participation in public resource management ordinary citizens.

 

·        The primacy of the Five-Year Plan and sector program budgeting. Woreda budgets are constructed primarily in pursuit of the goals of the FYP, as exemplified in the programs of the various regional line ministries (in particular Education, Agriculture and Health). In practice this meant that the bulk of the woreda budget went to pay the salaries of civil servants stationed in the woreda, while a significant proportion of the woreda’s potential transfer from the Federal Government was used for civil service salaries at the regional and zonal levels.

 

·        The discretionary allocation of transfers to woredas. As described in para. 7.22, transfers are informally offset to take account of extra-budgetary inputs. The ad hoc and nontransparent way in which this is done has in some cases generated suspicion and a sense of disempowerment at woreda level.

 

·        Reducing the woreda capital subsidy on account of emergency food/cash relief inputs. This particular form of offset deserves special attention. While understandable, given the sums involved, the practice clearly runs counter to Federal Government policy. In so doing it denies the poorest woredas an additional capital boost which, it may be argued, is needed if they are to be lifted from poverty. This would be less of an issue were the evidence on the sustainability of FFW/CFW/EGS-constructed assets more favorable[71], and the type of assets provided broader in nature (these emergency programs are not systematically planned or predictable, and are not used to build schools, health centers or water systems – in effect reducing the provision of these basic services to poor communities). Due to the way in which FFW/CFW/EGS programs are administered, moreover, there is no compensatory accumulation of private savings either[72].

 


D.  Service Delivery

 

7.40     The regional constitutions delegate broad powers over local development to the woreda councils, charging them with the administration of public fiscal resources made available to the woreda. Woredas have specific responsibility for the construction and maintenance of tracks, water points and administrative infrastructure; the management of primary school, health and veterinary facilities; the design and execution of agricultural development programs; and the protection of the woreda’s natural resources. The study team set out to review the extent to which the governments of the study woredas in fact discharged these powers in 1998-99, with specific illustrative reference to four sectors – education, health, agriculture/veterinary services, and water.

 

7.41     A Profile of Selected Basic Services in the Study Woredas. To inform the discussion, the team consulted with the various study focus groups, woreda officials and Government staff to gain insight into the services provided and how service provision is perceived. This service profile is framed under three topics physical access, functional access, and quality of service.

 

7.42     Physical access and coverage. Section C above showed that civil service salaries consumed the bulk of public funds budgeted for the study woredas in 1998-99. The uniform nature of the structures and products of the various sector agencies across woredas suggests that the allocation of development resources embodied Federal decisions on the approach to service delivery – one which relied fundamentally on direct service provision by cadres of Government technical staff. Implicit in this supply-side model is good coverage. In practice, the affordable number of Government staff was small. In 1998-99, the total of the Federal and regional budgets combined amounted to some ETB1.6 billion for all forms of expenditure, which translated to per capita Government expenditure of only $27,[73] which is also reflected in low levels of staffing in the contact areas (see Table 7.16 below).

 

7.43  Staff-in-post across sample woredas ranged from an average of 2.0 per 1000 persons in Awabel to 5.6 in Agarfa[74].  This suggests significant variations the ability of woredas to staff facilities such as schools or health clinics, and therefore, improve utilization rates over time.  Table 9.1 at the end of the Main Report shows technical staff positions and vacancies in eight of the study woredas in early 2000. Although some of the quality of data in the table may be at issue, it suggests that the overall level of vacancies was acceptable (17 percent), though relatively high in administration, finance and agriculture (41, 39, and 39 percent respectively). The data also shows that the overwhelming majority of staff in the sample were employed in the education sector (67 percent), and that education bureau vacancies were generally very low (9 percent overall). To the extent that regional variations manifest from such a small sample, vacancies were more prevalent in the Amhara study woredas (29 percent overall – though this result is skewed by Tach Gayint, which has a suspiciously high vacancy ratio in education).

 

Table 7.16:  Numbers of Technical Woreda Staff in Selected Sectors, 1998-99

Zone

Woreda

 

 

Woreda Population

 

Number of technical staff

at woreda level

 

 

Staff in post/1000 persons and ranking

 In Post

Vacancies

 

 

 

East Gojam

 

Awabel

 

165,312

 

336

 

81

 

 

    

      2.00 (9)

 

 

South Gonder

Farta

241,101

592

156

      2.50 (7)

 

Tach Gaynt

95,666

337

282

      3.50 (4)

 

Borena

 

Liben

 

117,700

 

570

 

74

 

      4.80 (2)

 

Bale

 

Agarfa

 

71,608

 

400

 

73

 

      5.60 (1)

 

East Shewa

 

Adami Tulu

120,695

411

48

      3.40 (5)

 

North-Omo

 

Sodo Zuria

224,688

878

76

      3.90 (3)

KSW

Konso

176,274

402

37

      2.30 (8)

Zone 1

Dubti

75,674

209

40

      2.80 (6)

 

7.44     Available staff resources also appear to have been deployed well. The physical coverage achieved by Government services in the study woredas, given prevailing staffing parameters, demonstrated careful attention to locational planning. Table 7.17 below shows this with concrete reference to selected services available in 15 kebeles. Almost all kebeles in the sample possess a primary school offering grades 1-4, and a resident DA. Human and animal health service access is somewhat spottier, with facilities and technicians sparse; and water, while generally available, often entails considerable household travel time. 

 

Table 7.17:  Access to Water, Education, Health and Agricultural Services in 15 Kebeles, 1999/00

 

 

Kebele

 

 

Water

 

Education

 

 

 

Health

 

 

Agriculture

Grades 1-4

Grades 5-6

Gr. 7-8

Gr.

9-12

 

Amhara Region

 

Enebi, Awabel

Yes. 2 protected springs but with waits of up to 6 hrs.

Yes

Yes

No

No

No. Nearest health post 2-3 hrs walk away; provides basic curative services and outreach vaccinations. No trained traditional birth attendant (TBA) in situ. Severe lack of drugs.

Yes, a DA offers seed/fertilizer packages to contact farmers, as well as managing SWC program. A 2-3 hr walk for veterinary services, which are considered very poor.

Woibla-Selamku,

Farta

Yes. Protected spring but complaints about required 10c weekly user payment.

Yes

Yes

No

No

No. Travel 2-3 hrs for basic curative services. Pre/postnatal care plus vaccination services provided in situ by visiting staff every two weeks.

Yes, a DA provides seed/fertilizer packages to the few contact farmers in the kebele, plus SWC. Veterinary post 2-3 hrs walk away, service considered reasonable though short of drugs.

Agat,

Tach Gayint

No. Need to walk 1km outside the kebele or use the river, which is hard to access, dirty, and has uneven flow.

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes. Health post in the kebele provides basic curative care and pre/postnatal care plus regular vaccinations. Trained TBA available.

Yes. 2 DAs live in the kebele and offer seed/fertilizer packages to a number of contact farmers, as well as extensive SWC program. Veterinary post situated 3 hrs walk away, but has very little medicine and rarely offers vaccinations.

 

Oromiya Region

 

Soro Kudosa, Adami Tulu

No.

Seasonal pond only.

Yes

No

No

No

No. Health post has been built but does not operate – no staff. No pre/postnatal services, no trained TBA.

Yes. DA provides seed/fertilizer packages to contact farmers. No Veterinary post; nearest 5 hrs walk away.

Gela Aluto,

Adami Tulu

 

Yes.

Hand pump.

Yes

No

No

No

No. No trained TBAs and no pre/postnatal services in situ, but sporadic vaccinations. Nearest facility 4 hours walk.

Yes. Usual seed/fertilizer/credit package. No veterinary post, nearest 4 hours walk, and no regular vaccinations, only when disease outbreak is reported.

Bunbun,

Liben

Yes. Several boreholes, but problems with sanitation and distance.

Yes

No

No

No

Yes. Sporadic health post opening times and lack of drugs. No pre/postnatal services. Monthly vaccinations. Trained TBAs in situ.

Yes, but package focuses on seed distribution (pastoral kebele). Annual livestock vaccinations but no veterinary post for 6 hours. Livestock medication hard to access and expensive.

Mugayo, Liben

Yes.

Hand pump and clean bore holes.

Yes

No

No

No

Yes. Irregular opening, indifferent health technician and no drugs. No pre/postnatal service but regular vaccinations. Trained TBAs in situ.

Yes, but seed-based package seen as inappropriate for this  pastoralist area. No veterinary post within a day’s walk.

Ambentu, Agarfa

 

Yes. Protected spring – but piped system broken. 

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No. Vaccinations and pre/ postnatal services provided in situ monthly. Nearest health post is 2 hr. walk.

Yes, DA provides standard seed/fertilizer packages. Nearest veterinary post 5 hours walk and no vaccination campaigns.

 

Southern Nations Region

 

Awasso, Konso

Yes. Protected source but 3 hrs walk for most. Further 5 seasonal springs.